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Preface
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the world’s most prominent forum for
international relations. As the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ
of the United Nations (UN), discussions and outcomes in the UNGA have shaped global
foreign affairs. Country representatives witnessed numerous memorable moments over
the last 75 years. Some six decades ago, Nikita Khrushchev famously took off his shoe
and furiously banged it on his table to protest against the Philippine delegation’s claim
that “Eastern Europe had been deprived of political and civil rights”. Muammar Gaddafi
was once introduced as the ‘king of kings’ before ripping a copy of the UN Charter in
defiance of the organization, and Hugo Chavez perceived the “devil’s smell of sulphur”
after George W. Bush had delivered his speech the day before. When Yasser Arafat was
invited to be the first speaker from a non-governmental organization, he entered the stage
with an olive branch and a gun holster. “Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand”,
he warned the audience.
Member states of the UNGA regularly vote on resolutions which are non-binding, non-
enforceable documents. Still, many decisions have made history: resolutions have led
to the foundation of UNICEF which has saved millions of children’s lives, proclaimed
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that enshrines undeniable basic freedoms,
or established the Sustainable Development Goals which fundamentally impact modern
policy-making. More generally, a country’s vote decisions on resolutions signal its stance
on foreign policies. Through voting, a nation can send a message that expresses aspi-
rations or concern, affirmation or condemnation, alignment or enmity. As a strategic
instrument of a foreign ministry’s repertoire, resolution voting may also be used to steer
public discussions, express diplomatic intentions or reach political agreements. Yet, the
reasons why a nation ultimately takes a certain voting decision are manifold, and often
remain opaque. My thesis aims at shedding light on three factors: spatial peer effects,
decoy voting, and fundamental policy shifts.
In Chapter 1, I address spatial peer effects on resolution voting in the UNGA. Scholars
have shown that seat adjacency of fellow legislators affects voting decisions of members of
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parliament at the sub-national (Masket, 2008), national (Cohen and Malloy, 2014; Saia,
2018) and trans-national level (Harmon et al., 2019). Physical proximity facilitates the
interpretation of non-verbal expressions and emotions of counterparts (Dolan Jr, 2016;
Renshon et al., 2017; Wong, 2020). ‘Face-to-face’ interactions may even activate neural
synchronization processes which affect how diplomats interact (Holmes, 2013, 2018). I
focus on delegates at the highest intergovernmental level who officially represent the
foreign policy stance of their country, examine the directional component of peer effects,
and distinguish between the strategic relevance of vote decisions.
I have compiled novel data on seating arrangements at the UNGA since country repre-
sentatives first met at the UN Headquarters’ General Assembly Hall in 1952. Data were
obtained through historical, previously unpublished floor plans. Information include the
date-specific physical position of delegations in the meeting venue, i.e. their seat, row
and column number, and their location relative to neighboring delegations for 92 seating
arrangements and votes on 5,334 contested resolutions. Institutionally, seating set-ups at
the UNGA are subject to exogenous shocks: lots are drawn to determine which country
occupies the first seat at the beginning of each session, new member states alter seating
arrangements when they are admitted to the UNGA, and existing member states switch
seats when they change their official English country name.
To examine whether voting behavior is affected by delegations seated nearby, I exploit the
random variation of the exact position of country representatives in the UNGA. My results
suggest that physical proximity in the meeting venue matters for voting outcomes: on
average, the vote agreement rate of adjacently seated delegations is 0.23 to 0.29 percentage
points (0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation) lower compared to all non-adjacent
delegations for all resolutions. Opposite effects are observed for strategically important
resolutions, however: seat neighbors are 0.72 to 1.24 percentage points (2.4 to 4 percent
of a standard deviation) more likely to vote in line with Arab League member states on
resolutions that deal with Middle Eastern issues. Vote agreement rates between former
colonial powers and delegations seated across the aisle in the back or directly behind
are 1.76 to 2.36 percentage points (5.6 to 7.5 percent of a standard deviation) higher
compared to non-neighboring country representatives.
In Chapter 2, I examine whether autocratic governments use decoy voting in the UNGA
to hide repression of their regimes. Becker et al. (2015) propose a model of expressive
behavior to explain autocratic voting. In their model, autocratic rulers experience a
loss of esteem when a resolution criticizes actions of their governments. Thus, they seek
to deflect international attention from their repressive behavior by criticizing another
country. To avoid a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in which autocratic regimes blame
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each other, they establish a logrolling agreement, which is stable as voting outcomes at
the UNGA are publicly published, and choose a decoy outside of their voting bloc.
Indeed, one member country of the UNGA appears intriguingly often on the debating
agenda: the State of Israel. Since 1950, about one out of five of all contested resolutions
in the UNGA was related to Israel or Palestinian issues, and more than nine out of ten
of such resolutions entailed criticism towards the only Jewish-majority nation. Despite
military confrontations in the 1950s and 1960s, average vote agreement rates with Israel
have started to decrease during the 1970s. This decline did not only coincide with the
admission of new autocratic regimes to the UNGA, but also with an increase in the
number of resolutions that primarily dealt with recurring, non-topical issues related to
Israel. Initial resentments against the State of Israel at the UN have made the country a
natural decoy for autocratic regimes.
I empirically test the decoy voting hypothesis. My sample includes votes on 4,878 con-
tested resolutions involving Israel between 1950 and 2018. The vote agreement rate of
fully autocratic regimes with Israel is on average 3.2 percentage points or 18 percent
of a standard deviation lower than among fully democratic governments for Israel- and
Palestinian issues-related resolutions. The effect is more pronounced for resolutions that
primarily deal with the State of Israel, with an estimated decline in voting alignment
of 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation. The results are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that autocratic governments use resolutions against the only
Jewish-majority state to fill the voting agenda and deflect attention from their regimes.
Finally, Chapter 3 deals with foreign policy shifts of the United States of America
(US) during the tenure of Donald Trump. To the surprise of many but himself, the
Republican Party’s nominee won the presidential election and assumed office in January
2017. The diplomatic relationship between the US and its Western allies deteriorated
shortly thereafter. Donald Trump initiated trade wars with partners at the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), threatened to withdraw from the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and publicly snubbed heads of states of the
Group of Seven (G7). The concurrent decline in common voting behavior between the US
and Western countries on resolutions in the UNGA, as measured by the vote agreement
rate and the absolute difference of ideal points, turns out to be statistically significant.
Heterogeneity analyses show a more diverse picture. While the US shifted its position
relative to Western partners on resolutions that dealt with the Middle East or economic
developments, for example, differences between both sides hardly changed for votes on
nuclear proliferation or disarmament. Some countries such as the Republic of Korea or
Hungary even had, on average, higher vote agreement rates with the US since Donald
Trump’s inauguration compared to all preceding US presidents. Concerning previous US
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administrations, we note that relations with Western partners did not hit an all-time low
during the Trump presidency: average vote agreement rates during George W. Bush’s
tenure were up to 7.0 percentage points lower.
One could conjecture that the ideological position of Western governments matters for
political alignment with the Trump administration. Especially leftwing governments in
allied countries may have been inclined to vote against the US since Donald Trump
became president. The empirical results suggest that the alienation of Western allies
is not driven by ideological distance based on a classical leftwing-rightwing government
ideology scale, however.
Each chapter of my thesis is a self-contained research article and can be read indepen-
dently. A consolidated bibliography and appendices for each chapter are included at the
end of the thesis.
Chapter 1
Spatial Peer Effects on Resolution
Voting Behavior
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1.1 Introduction
“For some reason, we have a certain chemistry.” The global community was bewildered
when Donald Trump, then-president of the United States of America (US), summarized
his relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after the Singapore Summit
in 2018. After threats of nuclear annihilation, tense hostility and angry tweets late
at night, a personal meeting led to a twist in US foreign policy. Although president
Trump’s diplomatic efforts may have been rather unorthodox, he was not the first to
recognize the importance of face-to-face meetings. History provides many examples of
personal interactions which shaped the trajectory of international diplomacy, including
the July crisis before World War I, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, or recent Middle
East negotiations (Wong, 2016).
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) constitutes the highest level of inter-
governmental diplomacy. Delegates which execute voting on behalf of their countries,
however, are still humans. Their decisions are not bounded by pure rationality, but may
be subjected to trust, sensibilities, or affection (Van Rythoven and Sucharov, 2019). Such
emotions are shaped by personal interactions with fellow delegates, and extend to how
diplomats game the political arena. It is conceivable that physical proximity facilitates
personal interactions, as well as information exchange, and thus affects voting behavior.
Institutionally, seating arrangements in the UNGA are determined by a lottery and ex-
ogenous shocks, providing a source of random variation in physical proximity - and hence
the likelihood of personal interactions - among delegates.
I compile novel data on seating set-ups in the UNGA since 1952. Using historical, pre-
viously unpublished floor plans, I reconstruct the date-specific physical location of each
country delegation during sessions of the UNGA, which predominantly took place in
the General Assembly Hall. My sample covers 92 exogenous alterations of seating ar-
rangements which were triggered by the commencement of a new session, admission of
member states and changes of official country names. To examine whether physical prox-
imity matters for political alignment in the UNGA, I compare the vote agreement rates of
adjacently and non-adjacently seated country delegations for votes on 5,334 resolutions.
My empirical results suggest that, on average, the vote agreement rate is 0.23 to 0.29
percentage points or 0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation lower for seating neighbors
compared to all non-neighboring delegations. Further heterogeneity analyses show that
spatial peer effects have been more pronounced in recent decades, depend on the exact
relative position of two delegations, and may even lead to an increase in voting alignment
for strategically important resolutions.
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Scholars have long established that social networks matter for political outcomes. As
Routt (1938) puts it, “personal contacts between human beings lie at the very heart
of all problems of government”. A common alumni connection among legislators, for
example, sharply increases the likelihood of trading votes in the US Senate (Cohen and
Malloy, 2014) and affects how interest groups allocate monetary contributions to political
campaigns (Battaglini and Patacchini, 2018). Social connections are even considered a
key determinant of overall legislative effectiveness (Battaglini et al., 2020).
A growing literature highlights the importance of physical proximity to reinforce polit-
ical networks. For example, non-verbal expressions of intentions and emotions during
diplomatic meetings, such as hand gestures or body language, carry enough emotive
information to ultimately influence policy decisions of governments1 (Dolan Jr, 2016;
Renshon et al., 2017; Wong, 2020). Research in social neuroscience has identified sub-
conscious mechanisms: physical proximity induces a feeling of intersubjectivity which let
the human nervous systems become mutually attuned, enabling social bonding among
political peers (Collins, 2005). In addition, face-to-face interactions activate the mirroring
system of the human brain, a neural synchronization process between individuals, which
facilitates to parse another diplomat’s intentions (Holmes, 2013, 2018).
Scholars have shown that seating arrangements, as a mode of physical proximity, influ-
ence political outcomes. Deskmates at the California State Assembly are more likely to
vote identically compared to non-deskmate legislators (Masket, 2008), and seat locations
on the chamber floor impact the voting behavior of newly elected US Senators (Cohen
and Malloy, 2014). Spatial effects also matter at the parliament of Iceland, where seat
distributions are based on a lottery system: politicians are more likely to diverge from
their own party line when the fraction of adjacently seated peers from an opposing party
is higher (Saia, 2018). At the European Parliament, elected members are seated by sur-
names within each party group, and seat neighbors in the same row are 0.6 percentage
points less likely to differ in their vote (Harmon et al., 2019). The proximity of randomly
allocated offices for members of the US Congress, however, does not predict common
voting patterns (Rogowski and Sinclair, 2012).
My research fills a gap in the political economy literature on spatial peer effects. Previ-
ous studies have focused on individual members of parliament in usually (sub-)national
settings, rather than official representatives of countries at the highest intergovernmental
level. I use novel data to identify directional effects of spatial positions on political align-
1 Rapport (2017) notes that many theories in foreign policy analysis about cognitive mechanisms are
biased toward populations that are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic.
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ment, distinguish between the strategic relevance of voting decisions, and cover a time
period of over six decades.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 1.2 presents a brief his-
tory of seating arrangements at intergovernmental organizations. Section 1.3 derives the
research hypotheses to be examined empirically, describes the data on and institutional
background of seating set-ups at the UNGA, and presents the empirical model to examine
whether physical proximity influences resolution voting outcomes. The results are shown
in section 1.4. Robustness tests are discussed in section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 History of Seating Arrangements at Intergovern-
mental Organizations
The League of Nations was among the first global forums after World War I. Founded
in 1920, the organization fostered diplomatic exchange, especially through its Assembly
which was the principal body and consisted of representatives of all 47 member states.
The organization held its first Assembly meetings between 15 November and 18 December
1920 at the Salle de la Réformation in Geneva, Switzerland. From the beginning, seating
space at the venue was constrained. Each delegation was allowed to bring only three
members, who shared tables with delegates from other member states (League of Nations,
1920). Seats were arranged in straight lines and divided by an aisle in the middle of the
hall (see Figure A.2). Coupled with rather poor acoustics, the seating set-up hindered
observing and hearing at the rostrum or across the hall (Mikkelson and Jourdenais, 2015).
Even before the first Assembly of the League of Nations took place, one of the orga-
nization’s specialised agencies began its work. In late 1919, the plenary body of the
International Labour Organization held its first annual meeting. Diplomats convened
at a conference hall of the Pan American Union Building in Washington, D.C., United
States. Delegates faced each other on tables which spanned the entire length of the
floor and were arranged in multiple straight lines. To face the rostrum, attendees had to
turn sideways, and space for personal items was cramped (see Figure A.1). The proto-
col of the first meeting mentions that complaints about acoustic difficulties were made
early on. Delegates specifically attributed poor hearing conditions to physical seating
arrangements. On 5 November 1919, for example, the South African delegation asked
the chairman to hear an amendment again because he “(...) could not hear anything
at this end of the hall” (ILC, 1920, p. 50). The Secretary-General responded to the
complaints and altered seating arrangements two days later to overcome “(...) the diffi-
culties which were experienced by some of the delegates seated at the farthest end of the
room” (ILC, 1920, p. 57). To make matters worse, delegates regularly engaged in private
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conversations with seatmates during plenary sessions2. The informal talks were so vivid
that on 20 November 1919, the chairman interrupted a speaker to “(...) ask delegates to
listen attentively, and to suspend private conversation in order to give [a delegate] the
opportunity of making her argument heard” (ILC, 1920, p. 102). Private conversations
continued, however, as a remark by the chairman that “(...) it is very difficult for [a
gentlemen on the left of the plenum] to hear what is going on, because of conversations
around the center of the floor” (ILC, 1920, p. 149) illustrates.
The League of Nations ceased to exist in April 1946. The organization was succeeded by
the United Nations, whose charter was already ratified in late 1945. Seating arrangements
at its main organ, the UNGA, have shaped policy discussions since the organization’s very
beginning.
The first meeting of the UNGA took place at the Methodist Central Hall in London,
United Kingdom, on 10 January 1946. With more floor space available, the UNGA used
a classroom-style seating arrangement with forward-facing tables in a middle column
and slightly inclined table rows at the left and right columns. The U-shaped set-up
made following the debates easier for delegations seated at the lateral extremes. With
the hall’s flat ground, however, views for delegations sitting at the opposite end of the
rostrum remained obstructed by representatives of member states sitting in front (see
Figure A.3). Delegates shared tables with other country delegations sitting adjacently,
including a second row of chairs for support staff.
The second, fourth, fifth and sixth sessions of the UNGA were held at Flushing Meadows
in New York City, United States. The UN used a building from the 1930 World’s Fair as
their temporary headquarters, and the UNGA met in converted ice- and roller skating-
rings (Reiter, 2015). Arranged in three columns and ten rows, seats were slightly tilted
towards the rostrum. A delegation had five seats at the desk and five seats behind them
available, and shared a table with other country representatives. With an upward-sloping
ground floor, views - and thus preconditions for participation - improved for delegates
sitting at the back of the hall (see Figure A.4). Additional space for spectators and
the media was provided at the rear through an elevated stand and glassed boxes at the
sidewalls of the hall.
For a single occasion, delegates moved to Paris, France. The third session of the UNGA
was held at the underground theater of the Palais de Chaillot. Spatial circumstances
surrounding the meeting were chaotic: craftsman were still renovating the hall when
2 Baigorri-Jalón (2005) notes that many diplomats as well as delegates of employers’ and workers’
organizations could not follow speeches in the official languages of the conference, English and French,
which may have fostered private conversations.
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the session had already started, crowded elevators got stuck and staircases were blocked
by construction material, spectators crowded the steps to the plenum, and most support
offices located in the building’s maritime museum were not ready. Seating capacity at the
meeting venue was scarce, too: of the 3,000 seats in the hall, 900 were reserved for each
the press and distinguished guests. The remaining 1,200 seats for delegates did not fulfil
the country members’ demand for support staff, and many diplomats were blusterously
wandering around to find a seat (Katzander, 1948). Those who did settle in a chair
found themselves arranged in three columns with the outer ones being slightly inclined.
Two delegations shared a table which accommodated ten delegates plus another ten seats
installed behind the desk-seats (see Figure A.5).
Finally, the UNGA moved to the permanent headquarters of the UN at the East River in
New York City, United States, for the opening of the seventh session. Since 14 October
1952, delegates have met at the General Assembly Hall which is 50 meters long and 35
meters wide. It occupies the second, third and fourth floors of the General Assembly
Building. Country delegations may occupy six seats, three at the tables for delegates
and another three seats behind them for support staff. Usually, two delegations share
one table in each column, and adjacent tables are divided by an aisle. Tables extend to
the back in rows which are upward-sloping and form a slightly U-shaped layout facing a
raised rostrum. The original set-up had four columns and ten rows which allowed for a
total of 70 UN member states (see Figure A.6).
The originally planned capacity was already exceeded in 1955. As UN membership grew,
the number of seats in the General Assembly Hall was increased. At first, new rows in
the back were appended, including an aisle between the 13th and 14th row. A major
expansion program, which added another column of seats on each side of the hall, was
completed before the 19th session in 1964. After the seating capacity was reached again in
1976, the UNGA decided to refurbish the hall, and added more rows in the back (United
Nations, 2008).
Due to renovations which started in May 2013, the 68th session was held at a temporary
meeting venue in the North Lawn Building of the UN Headquarters. Seats were arranged
in straight lines spanning four columns and nine rows. Each delegation occupied three
seats at the table and another three seats directly behind them. Six country representa-
tives shared a single table at the inner two columns, and five delegations sat adjacently
at tables at the outer two columns. Because views of the rostrum were obstructed by pil-
lars, television screens were installed for delegations at the extreme ends of the conference
room to broadcast the speaker at the podium (see Figure A.7). Delegates returned to
the General Assembly Building for the closing of the regular session in September 2014.
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As of 2021, the General Assembly Hall hosts 193 country delegations seated in six columns
and 17 rows (see Figure A.8). To cast votes, delegations press red, yellow or green buttons
installed on the tables in front of them. Large panels behind the speaker’s rostrum list
country-specific votes (see Figure A.9). Glass-walled rooms are installed on the sides of
the room and host interpreters, media representatives and UN staff.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, only one representative per country was allowed to
attend meetings during the 75th session, and delegates were seated at the extreme ends
of each table (see Figure A.10).
In short, seating arrangements at the UNGA have regularly undergone modifications over
the last decades to improve preconditions for interactions among country delegates.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Hypotheses
Informal interactions play a major role in political decision-making. Legislators consider
advice by their colleagues before casting a vote (Kingdon, 1989), and may even just
follow the lead of someone who immediately precedes them in the alphabet (Matthews
and Stimson, 1975). Studies concurrent with my research find spatial peer effects on
voting behavior in different legislative settings (Cohen and Malloy, 2014; Harmon et al.,
2019). It is conceivable that spatial interactions extend to UNGA delegates.
Hypothesis 1. Adjacently seated delegations influence voting decisions of country rep-
resentatives on resolutions at the UNGA.
Repeated face-to-face interactions can undergo a process of emergent alienation and be
characterized by estrangement or even local enmity (Holmes and Wheeler, 2020). Such
negative social bonds may be motivated by domination preferences where individuals seek
to control the rhythm of interactions through conflictual acts (Bramsen, 2017). I expect
that negative social bonds dominate when a country representative does not have strong
preferences for vote decisions and resorts to spatial cue-taking.
Hypothesis 2. Adjacently seated delegations are less likely to vote aligned on general
resolutions.
The case of buying votes for strategically important resolutions is well documented. Schol-
ars have linked strategic vote influence at the UN to monetary benefits, such as bilateral
foreign aid (Wang, 1999; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Carter and Stone, 2015; Alexander
and Rooney, 2019) or multilateral development loans (Andersen et al., 2006; Dreher and
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Jensen, 2007; Dreher et al., 2009; Dreher and Sturm, 2012). I assume that vote buy-
ing has a non-monetary component, too: delegations may sway other representatives to
vote in a certain manner through persuasion, cajoling or social pressure. Salient issues
may foster interactions with seating neighbors and encourage more in-depth discussions
among representatives. Hence, I expect that voting alignment between seating neighbors
is higher if a resolution is strategically important for one of the country delegations.
Hypothesis 3. Adjacently seated delegations are more likely to vote aligned on strategic
resolutions.
The physical direction of interactions matters (Saia, 2018). Engaging with another dele-
gation is facilitated when both share the same table and do not need to bridge an aisle.
Delegations in direct back and front seat locations may be more difficult to address,
as representatives have to fully turn around to engage with each other. I expect that
the relative position of seating neighbors at the UNGA has different effects on voting
alignment.
Hypothesis 4. Spatial peer effects on voting behavior are anisotropic.
Overall, I expect that the average vote agreement rate between two country delegations
at the UNGA is smaller for seating neighbors compared to all non-adjacently seated dele-
gations for general resolutions, and is higher for strategically important resolutions. The
spatial effect on voting alignment should depend on the relative orientation of adjacently
seated delegations.
1.3.2 Data and Institutional Setting
I compile novel data on seating arrangements of country delegations at the UNGA since
1952 when delegates first convened at the General Assembly Hall. The data include the
date-specific physical position of delegations in the meeting venue, i.e. their seat, row
and column number, and spatial information on their location relative to neighboring
delegations for votes on 5,334 contested resolutions.
The basic seating layout in the General Assembly Hall has remained unchanged since
the seventh session in 1952. Usually, each country delegation has eight other delegations
as direct seating neighbors: one neighbor sits next to the delegation at the same table,
another delegation is seated across the aisle in the same row, representatives of two
countries have seats diagonally at the front and back table, another two delegations sit
diagonally across the aisle in the front and back, and two delegations sit straight to the
front and back in the adjacent rows. Figure 1.1 exemplary illustrates the spatial positions
of adjacently seated delegations.
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Figure 1.1: Spatial positions of adjacently seated delegations, stylized example
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The exact physical location of each country delegation in the General Assembly Hall is
determined at random. Four exogenous shocks may alter seating arrangements:
First, the initial seating set-up at the beginning of each session is randomly determined.
The UNGA usually meets every year in fall for a regular session (United Nations, 2016,
I.1). On the day of the election of the President of the UNGA, the Secretary-General
draws lots to determine which country delegation will occupy the first seat at the right
end of the front row as seen from the podium. The remaining delegations are then seated
in alphabetical order according to the official English names of their country (United
Nations, 2019a).
Historical and previously unpublished copies of floor plans for initial seating arrangements
at the beginning of sessions have been obtained through the United Nations (2019b) for
the seventh to 44th session3, and through the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (2019)
for the 55th, 61st to 65th, 67th and 68th, 70th and 71st, and 73rd sessions. The floor plan for
the 72nd session was obtained through United Nations (2017). I reconstructed the initial
seating arrangements for the 52nd to 54th, 56th to 60th, 63rd, 66th and 69th sessions using
information on which country occupies the first seat, which is provided in the Delegates
Handbooks (United Nations, 2021a), and the official roster of member states from the
Yearbooks of the UN’ appendices (United Nations, 2021g). No data were available for
the 45th to 51th session.
My sample includes 60 new seating arrangements due to the commencement of a session.
3 See Figure A.11 for the initial floor plan of the 37th session as an example.
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Second, seating arrangements change when a new member state is admitted to the UNGA
after a session has already started. Once a country has applied to the Secretary-General
and the Security Council recommends the applicant state for membership, the UNGA
needs to pass a resolution with a two-thirds majority of the existing members to approve
the application (United Nations, 2016, XIV.134 and 136). If the application is approved,
the membership becomes immediately effective (United Nations, 2016, XIV.138). The
newly admitted country’s delegates are seated after the resolution is passed and before the
next resolution is voted on. The representatives are seated according to their country’s
official English name, and all existing delegations that follow behind in alphabetical order
move one seat up (United Nations, 2019c).
Data on votes of new member states were obtained through Voeten (2013). 24 changes
of the seating order occurred due to the admission of new member states.
Third, a country may change its official English name during an ongoing session. A name
change may occur with or without a jurisdictional change, and can be announced at any
time. The permanent mission to the UN of the member state informs the UN Chief of
Protocol of any change to the official country name (United Nations, 2020, XVII.). Once
the name change is received, the UNGA delegation gets seated alphabetically as per their
new English country name, and a revised seating plan is put together (United Nations,
2019c). Historic examples during ongoing sessions include the name change of Dahomey
to Benin or of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to North Macedonia.
Data on official country name changes were obtained through press releases by the United
Nations (2021c). The seating order was altered eight times because countries changed
their official name during a live session.
Finally, a country may be removed from the UNGA once a session has already begun.
The concerned delegation would vacate their seat, and all delegations from countries
whose name follow behind the removed member in the English alphabet move one seat
down (United Nations, 2019c). A removal of a delegation may occur for three reasons:
First, a member state may be dissolved or merged with other existing member states.
Examples include Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which merged to form the single member
of the United Republic of Tanzania, or the German Democratic Republic which was
dissolved after the reunification of Germany. Second, a member state against which
preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council can be suspended
by the UNGA (United Nations, 2016, II.5). Third, a member of the UN which has
persistently violated the principles contained in the UN Charter may be expelled upon
the recommendation of the Security Council (United Nations, 2016, II.6). Theoretically,
a country may also unilaterally withdraw from the UN. The UN Charter does not regulate
this process, however.
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In my sample, no change of the seating order occurred due to the removal of a delegation
during an ongoing session4,5.
Table A.1 lists all seating arrangements since the seventh session of the UNGA in my
sample. Note that each session has at least one unique seating arrangement, as the first
seat in the hall is allocated randomly at the beginning of a session.
1.3.3 Econometric Model
I estimate the following fixed effects model to examine whether seat adjacency of country
delegations in the General Assembly Hall affect political alignment on resolution voting:
V oteagreementijrtys =α + Seatneighborijrtys,m’βijrtys,m + Piy’γiy + ∆ Pijy’ζijy
+ Rrtys’υrtys + Dirtys’ωirtys + ∆ Dijrtys’ϑijrtys + Eiy’ιiy
+ ∆ Eijy’τijy + Lijrtys’κijrtys + Sis’ψis + ηi + ξj + µs + εijrtys
where V oteagreement is the vote agreement rate in percentage points between the UNGA
delegations of country i (the ‘focal country’) and j (the ‘paired country’) on the contested
resolution r on date t in year y given the seating arrangement s according to Voeten
(2013). The vote agreement rate is 100 if the focal country voted the same as the paired
country delegation, 50 if country i voted with either ‘in favor’ or ‘against’ and country
j voted with ‘abstain’ (or vice versa), and zero if the focal country voted with ‘in favor’
and the paired country voted with ‘against’ (or vice versa).
The vector Seatneighbor contains up to m = 1, . . . , 8 seating dummy variables that
capture physical proximity in the General Assembly Hall. Table neighbor has the value
one if the paired country shares a table with the focal country delegation, and zero
otherwise. Aisle neighbor is one if delegation i sits across the aisle in the same row as
delegation j, and zero otherwise. Diagonal front table neighbor is one if country j sits
diagonally at the table in front of country delegation i, and zero otherwise. Diagonal
4 UNGA Resolution 47/1 marginalized Yugoslavia from the General Assembly in support of Security
Council Resolution 777. Yet, Yugoslavia still remained a member of the UN because the legal successor
state was disputed, and the country’s official expulsion from the UNGA did not influence the seating
order. The state kept an empty seat without delegates even after its effective dissolution (Jovanovic,
1997). The placeholder was only removed from the UN country roster and UNGA seating lists once
all five independent successor states had been admitted as new UN members.
5 In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 20 January 1965, Indonesia unilaterally announced its
withdrawal from the UN “(...) at this stage and under the present circumstances”. After a coup d’état,
however, the country sent a telegram to the Secretary-General dated 19 September 1966 stating that
they would “(...) resume full cooperation with the United Nations and resume participation in its
activities”. Shortly thereafter, the UNGA invited representatives of Indonesia to take their seats in
the General Assembly Hall (United Nations, 2021b). The absence has retrospectively been interpreted
as a cessation of cooperation rather than a full withdrawal.
1.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 16
back table neighbor is one if the paired country occupies the seat diagonally behind the
focal country at the table in the same column, and zero otherwise. Diagonal front aisle
neighbor and diagonal back aisle neighbor are one if country j sits diagonally across the
aisle either in front or behind delegation i, and zero otherwise. Front neighbor has the
value one if the paired country is seated directly in front of country i in the same column,
and zero otherwise. Finally, back neighbor is one if country j sits directly behind the focal
country in the same column, and zero otherwise. In a more generalized specification, only
the variable seat neighbor is included. It has the value 1 if one of the previous seating
variables is one, and zero otherwise.
Variables that control for political characteristics of each focal country are included in
the vector P. Previous research has shown that the type of government influences UNGA
voting decisions (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Hillman and Potrafke, 2015; Mosler, 2020). I
use the continuous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) to classify the level
of democracy of country i. The index is one for fully democratic countries and zero for
autocratic regimes.6 The ‘political color’ of governments affects voting decisions at the
UNGA (Dreher and Sturm, 2012). I consider the ideological position of a government
by including a binary indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) which is one if the focal
country i has a communist government, and zero otherwise. I assume that not only a focal
country’s level of characteristics, but also the difference to its paired country matters for
vote agreement rates. ∆P includes the absolute differences of the democracy index and
the communism indicator between countries i and j.
More than half of the topics on the agenda of the UNGA in a given year are not novel,
but have been discussed in the past (Panke, 2014). The vector R controls for the content
of contested resolutions. I include a set of binary indicators for six recurring topics:
the variables are one if a resolution concerns either colonialism, human rights, economic
development, the Middle East conflict, nuclear proliferation, or disarmament, and are
zero otherwise. Data are provided by Voeten (2013).
D are control variables at the delegation-level. Scholars have shown that the gender
of legislators influences voting behavior (O’Regan, 2000; Jenkins, 2012; Ramstetter and
Habersack, 2020). I use Christensen (2021)’s data to construct three dummy variables
which are one if the focal country i has either a female executive state leader, female
Minister of Foreign Affairs, or female Permanent Representative to the UN, and are
zero otherwise. I assume that experience and legacy of a member state affect its voting
decision, and include the number of days since a focal country first voted on a contested
6 Gründler and Krieger (2019)’s democracy index is built using support vector machines which recognize
data patterns. See Gründler and Krieger (2016) for a detailed description of the estimation procedure.
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UNGA according to Voeten (2013). Moreover, elected members of the UN Security
Council are shown to behave similarly with the council’s permanent members in the
UNGA (Hwang et al., 2015). I include a binary indicator for non-permanent UN Security
Council membership of country i. ∆D adds the absolute differences between countries j
and i for all delegation-level variables.
Following related studies (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Smith, 2016), I control for the growth
of output-side real GDP, real GDP per capita, and the population size of country i
according to Feenstra et al. (2015) with the vector E. I include the differences of all
macro-variables between each focal and paired country with ∆E.
The vector L contains two variables which address linguistic similarities between the offi-
cial English country names of the focal and paired country. Country names may indicate
underlying characteristics of nations, such as state building, geographical characteristics
or forms of government7. Orthographic similarity of country names is measured by the
standardized Levensthein distance, i.e. the smallest number of changes needed to trans-
form the characters of one country name into the other. For phonetic similarities, I use
a dummy variable which is one if both country names sound similar according to the
SoundEx algorithm, and is zero otherwise. The SoundEx algorithm encodes homophones
to the same letter-number code representation, and disregards potential differences in
spelling.
S controls for the overall seating position of the focal country. It contains the country’s
seat and column number in the General Assembly Hall.
I include η and ξ as country-fixed effects. µ are seating arrangement-fixed effects which
control for spatial-fixed effects of the seating set-ups, which change over time as rows
and columns at the meeting venue are added to accommodate the growing number of UN
member states, and for time-fixed effects of voting sessions. Finally, ε denotes the error
term. Standard errors are clustered at the seating arrangement-level.
Table A.2 lists the summary statistics of all variables.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 General Spatial Peer Effects
Seating arrangements affect political alignment in the UNGA. Table 1.1 presents the
estimation results for the average effect of seat adjacency on the vote agreement rates
7 Note, however, that most UN member states have chosen to not include their form of government in
their official English country name.
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for contested resolutions between 1952 and 2019. Column (1) shows coefficient estimates
without control variables. Political and resolution-specific variables, delegation-level vari-
ables, as well as economic and population variables are included as additional controls in
columns (2) to (4). Variables that control for name similarity and a delegation’s location
in the meeting venue are added in column (5). The full specification with country- and
seating arrangement-fixed effects is shown in column (6).
Table 1.1: General spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General seat neighbor -0.4135*** -0.5947*** -0.4319*** -0.2867*** -0.3944*** -0.1466**
(0.1533) (0.1604) (0.1151) (0.1608) (0.1031) (0.0727)
Constant 82.5061*** 90.5025*** 88.2217*** 89.9109*** 88.5862*** 557.7821***
(0.4003) (0.9245) (1.3316) (1.1206) (1.2411) (113.6666)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 79,742,480 68,079,315 68,079,315 55,040,433 48,947,754 48,947,754
Adjusted R2 0.0000 0.0407 0.0429 0.0526 0.0534 0.1460
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
All coefficient estimates in Table 1.1 are negative and statistically significant at the one
(columns [1] to [5]) and five percent-level (column [6]). With fixed-effects included in
column (6), the coefficient estimate suggests that on average the vote agreement rate
of seat neighbors is 0.15 percentage points or 0.5 percent of a standard deviation lower
compared to all non-adjacent delegations in the General Assembly Hall.
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The average effect of seat adjacency on vote agreement rates has varied over time. Fig-
ure 1.2 presents the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of the seat
neighbor variable employing the full empirical specification with fixed-effects (column [6])
for each decade separately.
Figure 1.2: Coefficient estimate and 95 percent confidence intervals of the seat neighbor
variable by decade
Note: The dot indicates the coefficient estimate, the horizontal line vizualizes the 95 percent confidence interval.
Sources: Voeten (2013), own calculations
The results suggest that seat adjacency did not have a statistically significant effect on
political alignment during the first three decades from the 1950s until the 1970s. The
coefficient estimate does turn out to be statistically significant for the 1980s, however:
physical proximity in the General Assembly Hall increased vote agreement rates in the
years preceding the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Physical proximity has negatively affected political alignment in the UNGA only during
the two most recent decades, the 2000s and 2010s.
Table 1.2 shows the estimation results if the spatial peer effect is disentangled into its
directional components. The effect of seat adjacency on resolution is measured for each
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neighbor of a delegation: table and aisle neighbors in the same row, the four diagonally
seated delegations, and the seat neighbors directly in front and at the back.
Table 1.2: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.1930 -0.2662 -0.1146 -0.2027 -0.6589*** -0.2726**
(0.2252) (0.2074) (0.1703) (0.1608) (0.1606) (0.1225)
Aisle neighbor -0.1585 -0.0169 0.1747 0.0486 -0.3664** 0.0769
(0.2049) (0.1915) (0.1552) (0.1524) (0.1619) (0.1408)
Diagonal front -0.5530*** -0.8692*** -0.7176*** -0.4502*** -0.4386** -0.2881**
table neighbor (0.1918) (0.2064) (0.1689) (0.1466) (0.1772) (0.1303)
Diagonal back -0.4294** -0.7199*** -0.5610*** -0.3334** -0.3099** -0.1721
table neighbor (0.1760) (0.1813) (0.1507) (0.1298) (0.1494) (0.1321)
Diagonal front -0.3629* -0.7080*** -0.5244*** -0.3522* -0.4157** -0.2344*
aisle neighbor (0.2123) (0.2170) (0.1818) (0.1813) (0.1895) (0.1303)
Diagonal back -0.3599* -0.7696*** -0.5836*** -0.4751*** -0.5145*** -0.2603*
aisle neighbor (0.1983) (0.2001) (0.1648) (0.1707) (0.1754) (0.1332)
Front neighbor -0.6080*** -0.6900*** -0.5470*** -0.1911 -0.1766 -0.0134
(0.1783) (0.1907) (0.1574) (0.1612) (0.1987) (0.1403)
Back neighbor -0.6419*** -0.7224*** -0.5850*** -0.3507*** -0.2738 -0.0059
(0.1541) (0.1635) (0.1343) (0.1241) (0.1655) (0.1332)
Constant 82.5061*** 90.5030*** 88.2221*** 89.9111*** 88.5837*** 557.7885***
(0.4003) (0.9244) (1.3315) (1.1206) (1.2413) (113.6673)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 79,742,480 68,079,315 68,079,315 55,040,433 48,947,754 48,947,754
Adjusted R2 0.0000 0.0407 0.0429 0.0526 0.0534 0.1460
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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The coefficient estimates for table and aisle neighbors lack statistical significance in
columns (1) to (4). Once I include linguistic and spatial location variables, however,
the coefficient estimates of both variables become negative and statistically significant at
the one and five percent-level (column [5]). The coefficient estimate of the table neigh-
bor indicator remains statistically significant at the five percent-level once fixed effects
are included in column (6). On average, a given country delegation is 0.27 percentage
points or 0.9 percent of a standard deviation less likely to vote in line with delegations
with which it shares the same table compared to all non-neighboring delegations on all
contested UNGA resolutions since 1952.
Seating neighbors in adjacent rows are on average less likely to be politically aligned with
diagonal seat neighbors compared to all other non-neighboring country delegations in the
General Assembly Hall. The four coefficient estimates of the diagonally seated delegations
are negative and statistically significant at least at the five percent-level once all controls
but the fixed effects are included in column (5). If country- and seating arrangement-
fixed effects are added in column (6), the coefficient estimates of the diagonal back table,
diagonal back aisle and diagonal front aisle neighbors remain statistically significant at
least at a ten percent-level. On average, the vote agreement rates of those diagonally
seated representatives are 0.23 and 0.29 percentage points or 0.7 to 0.9 percent of a
standard deviation lower than rates of non-neighboring delegations.
For front neighbors, the coefficient estimates are negative and statistically significant at
the one percent-level in column (3), and for back neighbors in column (4). The coefficient
estimates of both variables lack statistical significance once I add controls for country
name similarity and the spatial location (columns [5] and [6]).
1.4.2 Strategic Peer Effects on Middle Eastern Issues
The Middle East conflict has dominated discussions at the UNGA since delegates first
met in New York. On average, every fifth contested resolution at the UNGA dealt with
issues related to the topic, including the question of Palestine and related UN missions.8
I consider a group of countries with high foreign policy interests in the issue, namely the
member countries of the League of Arab States. Only resolutions about Middle Eastern
issues remain in the sample. Table 1.3 presents the estimation results for the effects of
seat adjacency on political alignment with Arab League member states.
Direct seat neighbors in the same row are more likely to vote in line with Arab League
member states on Middle Eastern resolutions compared to non-adjacent delegations. The
8 See Chapter 2 and Mosler (2020) for more details concerning Israeli- and Palestinian issues-related
UNGA resolutions.
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Table 1.3: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.5768 0.9110* 1.2710*** 1.6656*** 2.4834*** -0.1719
(0.5214) (0.4609) (0.4210) (0.3908) (0.3589) (0.2601)
Aisle neighbor 0.0755 1.2929*** 1.9041*** 2.7268*** 3.9967*** 0.7507***
(0.4369) (0.3959) (0.3711) (0.3849) (0.3629) (0.2225)
Diagonal front 1.0377* 0.8872* 0.8984* 1.0764** 1.3258** 0.0762
table neighbor (0.5912) (0.4896) (0.4696) (0.4921) (0.5502) (0.3717)
Diagonal back 0.7930 -0.4725 -0.2644 -0.3885 0.1193 0.8689***
table neighbor (0.6555) (0.6506) (0.6250) (0.7249) (0.7811) (0.3130)
Diagonal front 0.1006 0.7287 0.9082* 1.1936** 1.5723*** 1.2440***
aisle neighbor (0.7403) (0.5431) (0.4870) (0.5035) (0.5468) (0.3191)
Diagonal back 0.7624 -0.2113 0.1147 0.1952 0.3403 0.7209**
aisle neighbor (0.5879) (0.4878) (0.4566) (0.5456) (0.6256) (0.2848)
Front neighbor 1.3110** 1.3656** 1.5912*** 1.8383*** 1.9764*** 0.5360
(0.4919) (0.5172) (0.5254) (0.6297) (0.6312) (0.3559)
Back neighbor -1.6981** -3.3359*** -3.0860*** -3.4869*** -4.2761*** -1.3254
(0.7345) (0.7282) (0.7160) (1.0197) (1.1339) (1.0506)
Constant 90.3622*** 98.3148*** 91.0362*** 90.5369*** 90.1272*** 360.7761***
(0.3604) (0.4646) (1.0727) (1.0501) (1.0772) (87.4881)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,764,621 1,548,893 1,548,893 1,230,606 1,080,148 1,080,148
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0627 0.0844 0.0877 0.0903 0.3958
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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coefficient estimates of the table and aisle neighbor are positive and statistically significant
at the one percent-level without fixed effects in column (5). With the full specification
in column (6), only the aisle neighbor variable remains statistically significant at the one
percent-level: the estimated increase in voting alignment is 0.75 percentage points or 2.4
percent of a standard deviation.
The coefficient estimates of three diagonal seat neighbors are positive and statistically
significant at least at the five percent-level once fixed effects are included in column (6):
the diagonal front and back aisle neighbors, and the diagonal back table neighbor. Vote
agreement rates increase by 0.72 to 0.87 percentage points or 2.3 to 2.8 percent of a
standard deviation if a delegation is seated diagonally to the back of representatives of
an Arab League member state. Voting alignment between an Arab League member state
and a delegation which is seated diagonally in front across the aisle is estimated to be 1.24
percentage points or 4 percent of a standard deviation higher compared to non-adjacent
delegations.
For column neighbors, the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at least at the
five percent-level without fixed effects (columns [1] to [5]). The coefficient estimates do not
turn out to be statistically significant, however, when country- and seating arrangement-
fixed effects are included in column (6).
1.4.3 Strategic Peer Effects on Colonialism
The issue of decolonization has played a major role in negotiations at the UNGA. About
one out of six resolutions that were ever tabled in the UNGA was related to colonialism.
In the decade between 1960 and 1970 alone, 28 former colonies gained independence and
were admitted to the UN as new member states. The topic has prominently remained on
the agenda of the UNGA until today.
I examine the political alignment of nine countries with a colonial past with their seating
neighbors: Australia, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain,
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The countries may or may not
have ruled colonies at the time of each resolution. Solely UNGA resolutions which cover
topics surrounding colonialism remain in the sample. I assume that such resolutions are
strategically important for countries with a colonial past.
Table 1.4 shows the estimation results for spatial peer effects on voting alignment with
the colonial powers for UNGA resolutions covering colonialism between 1952 and 2019.
The results suggest that direct seating neighbors in the same row support colonial powers
even less than all other non-adjacent delegations in the UNGA. Once linguistic and spatial
control variables are added in columns (5) and (6), however, coefficient estimates on both
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Table 1.4: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.6309 0.0795 0.7904 0.8859 -2.1760*** -2.9247***
(0.7754) (0.6931) (0.6973) (0.5915) (0.6522) (0.6049)
Aisle neighbor -1.1768 -1.1785* -0.3039 -0.0453 -3.9753*** -3.2671***
(0.7841) (0.6050) (0.5997) (0.6062) (0.9343) (0.8014)
Diagonal front -0.8313 0.8326 1.0404 0.1211 0.2536 0.4440
table neighbor (0.7087) (0.7797) (0.7161) (0.7961) (0.9186) (0.7882)
Diagonal back -0.7038 -0.9220 -0.1902 0.0634 0.7678 1.0145
table neighbor (0.8584) (0.9174) (0.9941) (0.9270) (0.9223) (0.6821)
Diagonal front -2.5088*** -0.1509 0.3907 0.7717 1.0335 0.1356
aisle neighbor (0.7920) (0.8867) (0.8250) (0.8633) (0.9375) (0.7962)
Diagonal back -1.1191 -0.4886 0.3491 1.4540** 2.2364*** 1.7562***
aisle neighbor (0.8961) (0.7475) (0.7404) (0.6584) (0.6641) (0.5460)
Front neighbor -2.3284*** -0.0569 0.5716 0.4572 0.6016 0.3718
(0.6679) (0.6678) (0.6284) (0.6318) (0.7550) (0.5647)
Back neighbor -2.9018*** -1.1009 -0.5260 0.9661 1.6592** 2.3620***
(0.6105) (0.7573) (0.7275) (0.6741) (0.7387) (0.4574)
Constant 66.8453*** 60.9893*** 56.0594*** 67.1480*** 66.6721*** 1,076.3880
(1.2744) (4.1320) (4.3587) (4.9976) (5.0511) (942.4094)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 678,266 616,201 616,201 545,879 500,936 500,936
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0714 0.1063 0.2081 0.2125 0.3067
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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variables are negative and statistically significant at the one percent-level. With fixed
effects included, the vote agreement rate between countries with a colonial past and their
table neighbors decreases by 2.92 percentage points or 9.3 percent of a standard deviation
for resolutions about colonialism. Aisle neighbors are 3.27 percentage points or 10.4 of a
standard deviation less likely to vote in line with colonial powers on colonialism topics.
Opposite effects on vote agreement rates are observed for delegations which sit diagonally
across the aisle or directly behind countries with a colonial past. Both coefficient estimates
are positive and statistically significant at the one percent-level with the full specification
in column (6). The results indicate that sitting diagonally to the back and across the
aisle of a country with a colonial past leads to an increase of vote agreement rates by
1.76 percentage points or 5.6 percent of a standard deviation. Seating neighbors directly
at the back row are 2.36 percentage points or 7.5 percent of a standard deviation more
likely to vote in line with colonial powers on resolutions covering colonialism.
All remaining coefficient estimates do not turn out to be statistically significant once
control variables are included.
1.5 Robustness Checks
Spatial peer effects should be observed for the first circle of seating neighbors, i.e. direct
neighbors. Personal interactions with delegations in the second seating circle, i.e. the
neighbors of neighbors, are hampered by country representatives seated in between. I
examine spatial peer effects with the 16 seating neighbors in the second circle for general
and strategically important resolutions (Tables A.3 to A.5). Out of the 48 estimated
coefficients, only one turns out to be statistically significant at the five percent-level and
only six are statistically significant at the ten percent-level.
Seating neighbors are drawn from a subset of the population as seats are arranged ac-
cording to the official English country names. A delegation whose country name begins
with ‘M’, for example, is likely be seated next to representatives from countries named
‘I’ to ‘R’, but is unlikely to sit close to delegations from countries whose official names
start with ‘A’ or ‘Z’. I exclude all paired countries that never sat adjacently to the fo-
cal country. Instead of all country delegations in the UNGA, the coefficient estimates
now indicate the difference in vote agreement rates between countries that are seating
neighbors at the date of the resolution vote and all countries that have at least once sat
together. On average for all resolutions, only the estimated coefficient for table neigh-
bors remains negative and statistically significant at the five percent-level (Table A.6).
Inferences regarding spatial peer effects for strategic resolutions about the Middle East
conflict and colonialism do not change (Tables A.7 and A.8).
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As an alternative measure of voting alignment, I disregard voting outcomes with an ab-
stention from either the focal country or the paired country. Results for the dichotomous
vote agreement rate without abstentions are shown in Tables A.9 to A.11. Inferences
regarding spatial peer effects do not change.
I check whether inferences depend on including or excluding individual control variables.
I replace the democracy index with the dichotomous version of Gründler and Krieger
(2019)’s index in Tables A.12 to A.14, Marshall et al. (2019)’s Revised Combined Polity
score (Tables A.15 to A.17) and Institutionalized Autocracy score (Tables A.18 to A.20),
and the democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) in Tables A.21 to A.23. For
all resolutions, the coefficient estimates of the diagonal front and back aisle neighbor
variables lack statistical significance once I use the Revised Combined Polity score or the
democracy indicator. These results depend on the specific samples, however: if I run the
estimation with the continuous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019), but
only use observations for which data by Marshall et al. (2019) or Bjørnskov and Rode
(2020) are available, the seating neighbor indicators lack statistical significance. For all
other specifications, inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.
I replace the growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population variables with data
by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014). Results are shown in Tables A.24 to A.26 Inferences
regarding spatial peer effects on voting behavior do not change.
Personal interactions are facilitated if two delegates have the same native tongue. I create
a dummy variable that is one if one of the four de-facto most widely spoken languages
in a country is the same in the focal and paired country, and 0 otherwise. I include the
binary indicator for having the same language as an additional control variable (Tables
A.27 to A.29). Inferences do not change.
Former colonial powers have often established strong diplomatic ties with their previous
colonies after the nations gained independence, and countries with a common colonial
history may share institutional characteristics such as a similar legal system. I add a
binary indicator which is one if the focal and paired country gained independence from
the same colonizing nation after 1952, and zero otherwise. Tables A.30 and A.31 present
the estimations for all resolutions and strategic votes about the Middle East. Inferences
regarding spatial peer effects do not change.
To control for all characteristics that do not vary over time between the focal and paired
country, I include country pair-fixed effects. Spatial peer effects on vote agreement rates
do not turn out to be statistically significant once I consider all contested resolutions (Ta-
ble A.32). Inferences for strategically important resolutions dealing with Middle Eastern
issues and colonialism, however, do not change (Tables A.33 and A.34).
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Finally, Tables A.35, A.36 and A.37 show the estimation results for all resolutions as well
as strategic resolutions about Middle Eastern topics and colonialism if standard errors
are clustered at the year-level. Inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.
1.6 Conclusion
I compile novel data on the physical location of country delegations at the United Na-
tions General Assembly since 1952 and exploit shocks to seating arrangements to examine
spatial peer effects on resolution voting. My results suggest that adjacently seated delega-
tions are, on average, less likely to vote in line with their neighbors: vote agreement rates
on contested resolutions are 0.27 percentage points (0.9 percent of a standard deviation)
lower for delegations that share the same table compared to all non-neighboring delega-
tions in the General Assembly Hall. Sitting diagonally across the aisle and at the back
table of a delegation decreases vote agreement rates by 0.23 to 0.29 percentage points
(0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation).
Opposite effects are observed for resolutions which are strategically relevant for the foreign
policy of a country. For resolutions dealing with the Middle East conflict, vote agreement
rates between Arab League member states and their aisle and diagonal seating neigh-
bors are 0.72 to 1.24 percentage points (2.3 to 4 percent of a standard deviation) higher
compared to non-neighboring country representatives. Regarding resolutions about colo-
nialism, vote agreement rates increase by 1.76 to 2.36 percentage points (5.6 to 7.5 percent
of a standard deviation) between countries with a colonial past and delegations seated
across the aisle in the back or directly behind them. Former colonial powers are, however,
less likely to vote in line with their direct row neighbors.
Global politics depend on where people sit. As a policy implication, the United Nations
may implement strategic seating set-ups as a low-cost way of encouraging diplomatic
exchange. More generally, physical proximity among political agents facilitates ‘face-to-
face’ interactions in many settings. Seat adjacency allows for informal coordination, and
may bridge a divide between two parties when formal relations are restricted. On the
contrary, “if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu” as a common saying puts it.
Policy-makers should consider such spatial peer effects when deciding on how to arrange
seats in their political forum.
Chapter 2
Autocrats in the United Nations
General Assembly
This chapter is published in the European Journal of Political Economy (Mosler, 2020).
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2.1 Introduction
There is evidence of pervasive corruption and rent seeking in countries with autocratic
governments (Gupta and Abed, 2002; Mbaku and Kimenyi, 2015; Liu and Peng, 2015;
Jetter and Parmeter, 2018; Gründler and Potrafke, 2019; Aidt et al., 2020). Further
evidence has shown that unethical behavior in autocratic governments extends to the
personal behavior of representatives of autocracies in the United Nations (Fisman and
Miguel, 2007, 2010). I empirically examine whether unethical behavior is transposed to
voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
In principle, unethical behavior is not expected in the United Nations (UN). The stated
purpose of the organization is to sustain peaceful relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights according to Article 1 of the UN Charter. Member
states of the UNGA unanimously adopted resolution A/RES/67/1 which states that
all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are
accountable to just, fair and equitable laws and are entitled without any discrimination
to equal protection of the law. Countries’ governments have publicly reaffirmed their
commitment to disavow discrimination many times. Yet, empirical evidence points to
a special place for Israel in UNGA voting. Since 1950, the first full year in which the
State of Israel participated in voting at the UNGA, around one out of five of all contested
resolutions was related to Israel. More than nine out of ten of these resolutions entailed
criticism or blame. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan obliquely addressed the
“long-standing anomaly that kept Israel from participating fully and equally in the work
of the organization” (United Nations, 2005).
In previous research, Becker et al. (2015) found that some two-thirds of UNGA resolutions
between 1990 and 2015 that named a country related to the State of Israel, almost
invariably in the context of criticism. They showed that data on human-rights violations
were inconsistent with the observed voting to criticize or blame Israel. To explain the
voting pattern, they proposed the decoy voting hypothesis that autocracies use UNGA
voting as a façade to hide their repression of their peoples. The façade is facilitated by
using voting to criticize Israel as a decoy to fill the voting agenda to deflect attention from
their regimes. Autocratic governments that have repressed their citizens and committed
atrocities faced limited resolutions or no resolutions at all, suggesting effectiveness of
decoy voting.
In this chapter, I empirically examine the decoy voting hypothesis. I test whether au-
thoritarian governments are less likely to be politically aligned with the State of Israel
in UNGA voting than democracies. A measure of political alignment is the vote agree-
ment rate in the UNGA, that is, the share of resolutions on which countries voted in the
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same or a similar way with either yes, no, or abstain. Voting alignment with the United
States of America (US) has been used to examine vote buying (Kegley Jr and Hook,
1991; Kim and Russett, 1996; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008; Woo and
Chung, 2018; Adhikari, 2019b), changes in leadership (Dreher and Jensen, 2013), intelli-
gence cooperation (Cordell, 2019), and foreign policy shifts under US president Donald
Trump (Mosler and Potrafke, 2020). Regarding political alignment with Israel, research
has shown that autocratic countries were more likely than democracies to vote in favor of
UNGA resolutions on the Goldstone Report1 which were critical towards Israel (Hillman
and Potrafke, 2015).
My sample includes votes on all 4,878 UNGA resolutions in which Israel participated
between 1950 and 2018. Of these resolutions, 957 deal with Israel and/or Palestinian
issues including related missions by the UN. On Israel- and Palestinian issues-related
resolutions, the average vote agreement rate of fully autocratic regimes is 3.2 percentage
points or 18 percent of a standard deviation lower than the vote agreement rate of fully
democratic governments. 404 UNGA resolutions deal primarily with the State of Israel.
Autocratic regimes were 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation less
likely to vote in line with Israel on these resolutions compared to democracies. Autocrats
require repressive behavior for regime security. My results support the hypothesis that
autocracies use UNGA decoy voting to deflect attention from their repressive behavior
toward their citizens.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 describes the theoretical
and institutional background concerning a potential voting bias against Israel by auto-
cratic regimes; data and descriptive statistics are presented in section 2.3; section 2.4
details the empirical specification; the results are presented in section 2.5; section 2.6
deals with robustness tests; and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theory and Institutional Background
Becker et al. (2015) propose a model of expressive behavior to explain voting of auto-
cratic regimes in the UNGA. Non-decisive expressive behavior applies because UNGA
resolutions are non-binding. In the model, autocrats choose a level of repression to max-
imize the sum of expressive utility and net material benefit, the latter being the sum of
gross material benefit from regime security minus the cost of repression. At the UNGA,
1 After military actions of Israel in Hamas-controlled Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009 to end missile
attacks on Israeli civilians, the United Nations Human Rights Council initiated a report on the war.
The Goldstone Report focused on accusations against Israel. It also proposed a principle that could
criminalize self-defense against state-supported terror that could be applied to the actions of any
country. The UNGA voted on two resolutions that were supportive of the Goldstone Report.
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delegations can criticize other governments through resolutions. If a government chooses
to criticize an autocratic regime, the autocratic ruler suffers a loss of expressive utility
through a loss of esteem. Said esteem decreases with the size of the majority that votes
in support of the resolution. If a resolution criticizes another government, however, an
autocratic ruler has higher expressive utility increasing with the size of the voting bloc
for the resolution from deflecting international attention from his or her own actions.
Becker et al. (2015) assume that the probability that a resolution which criticizes an
autocratic ruler is put up for a vote increases with the degree of repression by the auto-
cratic regime and decreases with the level of repressions applied by all other governments.
With simultaneous and independent voting, an autocratic government does not vote for
a resolution that criticizes itself but votes for any resolution that criticizes any other
government. The Nash equilibrium without voting discipline is thus a ‘tragedy of the
commons’ in which autocratic governments criticize one another. This non-cooperative
equilibrium can be avoided by cooperating on voting on resolutions. A credible logrolling
agreement among autocracies decreases the likelihood that any autocratic government
is criticized in an UNGA resolution. Logrolling is possible because voting outcomes on
UNGA resolutions are publicly published at the country-level. A coalition is stable if the
disutility from being criticized by other governments is greater than the expressive utility
derived from criticizing other governments of the voting bloc. With a stable logrolling
coalition in place, no autocratic government is criticized. To derive utility from criticizing
another government, a decoy is chosen as a Schelling focal point. Applying the model to
UNGA voting, Becker et al. (2015) identify the State of Israel as the unique decoy.
The history of Israel at the UN makes the only Jewish-majority state a natural decoy. The
UNGA passed resolution A/RES/181 on 29 November 1947 that provided for the creation
of separate Jewish and Arab states in the part of Mandatory Palestine that remained
after the United Kingdom had unilaterally created Transjordan in 1921. Israel accepted
the resolution, while the Arab states did not, whereupon Israel’s War of Independence
ensued2. The UNGA approved the admission of the State of Israel to the UN on 11
May 1949. Resolution A/RES/273 passed with 37 delegations voting in favor, 12 voting
against and nine abstentions. Countries voting in opposition were almost all governed by
autocratic regimes.
2 Shortly after the vote on resolution A/RES/181, fighting broke out. In an attempt to stop the fighting,
resolution A/RES/186 was passed on 14 May 1948. On the same day, the prime minister of Israel,
David Ben-Gurion, announced the foundation of the modern State of Israel in a declaration of inde-
pendence, which in turn set off the first Arab-Israeli War in which seven Arab armies confronted the
new state.
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Initial resentment against Israel was present to be exploited in choice of a voting decoy
as the number of autocratic regimes that were UNGA members increased in the post-
colonial era. The State of Israel has experienced ongoing discrimination at the UNGA. For
example, since the establishment of the United Nations Regional Groups in the 1960s,
which are geopolitical blocs for voting and personnel decisions at the UNGA, Israel’s
entry into the Asian and the Pacific Group was blocked by autocratic states. Specific
resolutions3 and official UN documents4 discriminated against Israel.
The puzzle is that many countries with autocratic regimes do not have a historical tradi-
tion of anti-Semitism. It is unlikely that autocratic rulers themselves have had personal
(negative) relationships or experiences with Jews. The bias against the Jewish-majority
nation can also not be ascribed to a general diplomatic denial of the State of Israel. As of
October 2020, 162 out of the 193 UNGA member countries (84 percent) had de-jure recog-
nized Israel and established official diplomatic relations. Some of the remaining countries
have acknowledged other indications of Israeli sovereignty or have had trade relations.
The decoy voting model addresses autocratic voting in the UNGA when autocratic rulers
have no ‘personal’ reason to single out Israel as the focus point for criticism.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To empirically test the decoy voting hypothesis, I examine whether autocratic govern-
ments are less likely to vote in line with Israel in the UNGA than governments of demo-
cratic countries. I use resolution-specific data from Voeten (2013) on voting outcomes of
the UNGA for the period from January 1950 to December 2018. My sample includes all
4,878 contested resolutions in the UNGA on which Israel voted5. I identify all contested
UNGA resolutions that deal with Israel and/or with Palestinian issues including missions
by the UN related to Israel or Palestinian issues6. As of 2018, 957 resolutions are in
3 On 14 December 1973, UNGA resolution A/RES/3151 condemned the “unholy alliance between
apartheid in Southern Africa and Zionism”. Shortly thereafter in late 1975, UNGA resolution
A/RES/3379 even called Zionism “a form of racism and racial discrimination”. On 19 October 1983,
a letter signed by 50 mostly autocratic countries questioned the credentials of Israel and tried to expel
the Jewish-majority state from the UNGA. The related resolution A/RES/38/180 called for a suspen-
sion of all diplomatic and economic relationships with Israel, a demand reaffirmed by resolutions put
forward every year until 1988.
4 Official UN documents from 1974 onwards name territories captured by Israel on the course of the Six-
Day War as “Occupied Arab Territories” or “Occupied Palestinian Territories”, while no such phrase
was used before 1967 during the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank and Egypt’s occupation of
Gaza.
5 I do not consider votes on paragraphs or amendments.
6 Resolutions at the UNGA with contested votes about UN missions have covered the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which is a subsidiary body of the
UNGA, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon whose funding is regularly approved by the
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this category. Out of these identified resolutions, 873 resolutions or 91.2 percent have
criticized Israel. 404 resolutions have primarily dealt with the State of Israel (and not
primarily with Palestinian issues and/or related UN missions) with 387 resolutions or
95.8 percent entailing criticism towards Israel.
To measure political alignment with Israel in the UNGA, I follow related studies (Thacker,
1999; Dreher and Sturm, 2012; Mosler and Potrafke, 2020) and set the vote agreement
rate between a country and Israel equal to 1 if both countries voted the same, equal to 0.5
if Israel voted ‘in favor of a resolution’ or ‘against a resolution’ and the other delegation
voted ‘abstain’ (and vice versa), and equal to 0 if Israel voted ‘in favor’ and the other
delegation voted ‘against’ (and vice versa).
Vote agreement rates with Israel were on average above 70 percent for the first two
decades after the country had joined the United Nations. Despite heightened tensions
due to military confrontations, the General Assembly was relatively little concerned with
Israel or Palestinian issues: only one out of thirty contested UNGA resolutions in the
1950s and 1960s dealt primarily with the Middle Eastern conflict. Matters changed
afterwards, however: the average vote agreement rate has constantly decreased since the
1970s and has been below 40 percent during the last decade. Major trends correlate with
the declining average vote agreement rate since the 1970s:
First, the absolute and relative number of UNGA resolutions dealing with Israel and
Palestinian issues has increased since the 1970s. Compared to the first two decades
combined, the UNGA voted on six times more Israel- and Palestinian issues-related re-
solutions during the 1970s and even 20 times more resolutions during the 1980s. Overall,
more than one out of five contested resolutions between 1970 and 2018 dealt directly or
indirectly with the Jewish-majority nation.
Second, the content of such resolutions has changed. Initially, Israel- and Palestinian
issues-related resolutions mainly addressed temporary events, including the so-called Suez
Crisis in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967. During the last decades, however, tabled
resolutions mostly dealt with recurring issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, the contin-
uation of UN missions or assistance to Palestinian people. The general tenor and content
of such repeated resolutions has varied little over time.
Third, the UNGA has become dominated by autocratic regimes. I classify government
types as either democratic or autocratic using Gründler and Krieger (2019)’s dichotomous
UNGA. Numerous other UN agencies, funds and programs have been active, especially in the West
Bank and Gaza. They were not considered because the UNGA either decided about their general (and
not only Israel- or Palestinian issues-related) operations or program funding, or because UN organs
other than the General Assembly, such as the Security Council, were concerned with their activities.
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democracy index. On average, about two thirds of UNGA member states during the
1950s and 1960s were democratic. The political composition of the UNGA has turned
afterwards, however: on average, more than half of all country delegations since 1970
have represented autocratic regimes.
Political alignment with Israel is closely linked to a country’s government type. Since
the State of Israel joined the UN, democratic countries maintained a higher political
alignment with Israel than autocratic regimes7. Among the countries with the highest
vote agreement rates with Israel have been the United States, Canada, Australia and
The Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. democracies of high integrity. Highly autocratic
regimes such as Turkmenistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea and
Cuba, on the other hand, have had low vote agreement rates with Israel.
Figure 2.1 shows the vote agreement rate with Israel in the UNGA for autocratic and
democratic governments according to the dichotomous version of Gründler and Krieger
(2019)’s democracy variable. On average, the difference in vote agreement rates between
both government types has been 10.5 percentage points since the State of Israel joined the
UN. This voting gap widened over time, however, from 7.3 percentage points before 1970
to 11.3 percentage points afterwards. Put differently, the difference in vote agreement
rates with Israel by government type is positively correlated with the absolute and relative
number of Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions.
The history of the UN provides many case studies that anecdotally support the link
between autocracy and political alignment with the State of Israel. Several delegations
changed their voting alignment with Israel when their countries transited from East-
ern Bloc-styled authoritarian regimes to rather Western-type democracies, for example.
Compared to the Cold War era, Poland and Romania doubled their vote agreement rate
with the State of Israel since 1990 for resolutions covering Israeli and Palestinian issues,
and Hungary even tripled its rate. Uruguay voted in line with Israel on two thirds of
resolutions that covered Middle Eastern issues before its coup d’état in 1973. During
the following right-wing military dictatorship until 1985 the rate dropped by almost 50
percent, only to (at least partially) recover again in the first years after democracy was
re-established. Diplomatic ties between Cambodia and Israel were completely cut when
the autocratic Khmer Rouge took power, and only restored once the UN-led transitional
authority in Cambodia had sponsored the first general elections in 1993.
7 The absolute levels of average vote agreements rates with Israel of some democratic countries, especially
in Europe, are still rather low. Potential explanations could be an ideological disapproval of the State
of Israel based on supersession (Longenecker, 2007) or anti-Semite tendencies (Voigtländer and Voth,
2012; Hillman, 2013).
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Figure 2.1: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for
votes on all contested resolutions between 1950 and 2018 by government type
Sources: Voeten (2013); Gründler and Krieger (2019), own calculations
2.4 Empirical Model
I estimate the following baseline panel model to examine whether autocratic regimes are
indeed less likely to vote in line with Israel at the UNGA than democratic governments:
Yit = α + β × Autocracyit +
12∑
l=1
γl ×Xit,l + µi + ηt + εit
where Y as the dependent variable measures whether country i in year t voted in line with
Israel. Political alignment is defined as the yearly average of a country’s vote agreement
rate with the State of Israel for contested UNGA resolutions using data by Voeten (2013).
Autocracy determines the degree of autocracy of a country’s government. It is measured
using the democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) who apply support vector
machines, i.e. data-driven machine learning algorithms designed for pattern recognition,
to classify a country’s government type8. I use the continuous version of the index and
mirror the variable: it assumes the value zero if a country’s government is considered
8 See Gründler and Krieger (2016) for a detailed description of the estimation procedure.
2.4. EMPIRICAL MODEL 36
fully democratic, and takes the value one if the government is fully autocratic.9 I expect
that the higher the level of autocracy, the lower the political alignment with Israel.
X contains l = 1, ..,12 control variables. To account for the economic development of a
country, I include the chained purchasing power parities corrected growth of output-side
real GDP and real GDP per capita in logarithmic terms according to Feenstra et al.
(2015). Following related studies (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Smith, 2016), I control for
the population size in logarithmic terms using data from Feenstra et al. (2015).
The share of the Jewish population relative to the total population is included as a proxy
for a country’s cultural affinity to Israel. Maoz and Henderson (2013) provide data on
the Jewish population at five year-intervals for the period from 1950 to 2010. The share
of Jews is linearly approximated for the years between two data points10.
States of the Arab League have boycotted Israel and were involved in several military
conflicts. I include a dummy variable that takes the value one if a country was a member
of the Arab League, and zero otherwise. Five countries have had an exceptionally high
average vote agreement rate with Israel of at least 70 percent for resolutions dealing
primarily with the Jewish-majority country: the United States of America, Palau, Nauru,
the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. I include a dummy variable that is one for each of
these country delegations, and zero otherwise11.
Voeten (2013) provides binary variables that have the value one if a resolution deals
with recurring topics, namely the Middle East, economic development, disarmament,
human rights, nuclear proliferation and colonialism, and are zero otherwise. I calculate
the country-specific share of votes on each topic relative to the number of votes on all
contested UNGA resolutions in each year and include the six topic-share variables as
control variables.
µ denotes country-fixed and η denotes year-fixed effects. ε represents the error term. To
address the issue of potential serial autocorrelation, I use Newey-West standard errors.
Following the approach of Greene (2018), I set the lag length of the Newey-West standard
errors to two.
Summary statistics of all variables are listed in Table B.1.
9 Spain between 1986 and 1988 and The Republic of Korea in 1996 have the lowest autocracy scores of
almost zero. Gambia in 1965 and Iraq in 2003 have the highest autocracy score of one.
10 There is no data available on the Jewish population after 2010. For the years 2011 until 2018, I assume
that the share of the Jewish population in each country remains constant at the 2010 value.
11 On average for Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions, the countries with the next highest
vote agreement rates with Israel are South Sudan (49 percent), Canada (44 percent), the Federal
Republic of Germany (42 percent) and Australia (39 percent).
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2.5 Results
Table 2.1 shows the regression results for the yearly average agreement rate between Israel
and other UNGA member countries for resolutions concerning Israel, Palestinian issues
or related UN missions for the period 1950 to 2018. If a government type switches from
fully democratic to fully autocratic, the regime is less likely to vote in line with Israel. All
coefficient estimates for the autocracy variable are negative and statistically significant
at the one percent-level. If fixed effects are excluded [column (2)], the coefficient estimate
indicates a decrease in vote agreement rates by 6.7 percentage points. With year- and
country-fixed effects included, the absolute value of the point estimate decreases to 3.2
percentage points or 18 percent of a standard deviation [column (4)]. The estimated
coefficients of the control variables all display the expected signs.
Table 2.1: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and
Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index -0.0670*** -0.0666*** -0.0744*** -0.0317***
(0.0071) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0111)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0196*** 0.0203*** 0.0075
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0081)
Growth of real GDP -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Logarithm of population -0.0026* -0.0018 0.0614***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0161)
Share of Jewish population 6.1406*** 5.8238*** -3.9192
(1.3878) (1.3153) (2.6741)
Member of Arab League -0.0792*** -0.0757*** 0.0665
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0421)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4358*** 0.4376*** 0.1247
(0.0686) (0.0660) (0.1159)
Constant 0.1632*** 0.2129*** 0.1028 0.6669
(0.0049) (0.0322) (0.7463) (0.7743)
Topic-share variables included?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects included? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects included? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,405 6,261 6,261 6,261
Countries 185 167 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0227 0.3810 0.4878 0.6089
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table 2.2 shows the results if the dependent variable includes only resolutions that pri-
marily deal with the State of Israel but do not deal with Palestinian issues or related UN
missions. The results suggest that autocratic regimes are even less likely to vote in line
with Israel than democratic governments when the State of Israel is directly addressed.
The point estimates of the autocracy variable are negative and statistically significant
at the one percent-level. With year-fixed effects in column (3), the point estimate of
the autocracy variable indicates a decrease in vote agreement rates by 8.5 percentage
points. When country-fixed effects are included, the estimated coefficient indicates that
fully autocratic regimes are 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation
less likely to vote in line with Israel than fully democratic governments (column [4]).
Table 2.2: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of
Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index -0.0925*** -0.0827*** -0.0846*** -0.0359***
(0.0073) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0126)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0172*** 0.0186*** 0.0119
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0094)
Growth of real GDP -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0042*** -0.0038** 0.0991***
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0183)
Share of Jewish population 6.8080*** 6.5724*** -2.8709
(1.5185) (1.4876) (3.0171)
Member of Arab League -0.0911*** -0.0913*** 0.0567
(0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0439)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4336*** 0.4372*** -0.2978
(0.0671) (0.0654) (0.1325)
Constant 0.1576*** 0.1785*** 0.4138 0.7242
(0.0050) (0.0348) (0.8364) (0.7725)
Topic-share variables included?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects included? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects included? 7 7 7 X
Observations 7,763 6,040 6,040 6,040
Countries 185 167 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0436 0.3469 0.3942 0.5523
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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2.6 Robustness Checks
Government ideology may well relate to political alignment with Israel12. I use govern-
ment ideology data by Cruz et al. (2018) which is available until 2017, and self-compile
data for the year 2018 to construct two dummy variables: the first variable has the value
one if a country’s chief executive is left-wing, and zero otherwise. The second variable has
the value one if the chief executive is right-wing, and zero otherwise. I use the baseline
specification and add both ideology variables as additional controls13. The coefficient
estimates for left-wing governments do not turn out to be statistically significant for
Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions (see Table B.2). The coefficient esti-
mate for right-wing governments is statistically significant at a one percent-level once the
country- and year-fixed effects are included in column (4). Right-wing governments are
2.8 percentage points more likely to vote in line with Israel than center governments for
resolutions involving Israel or Palestinian issues. For the sub-sample of resolutions that
primarily deal with the State of Israel, right-wing governments are 3.7 percentage points
more likely to vote in line with Israel once all control variables are included. Inferences
regarding autocratic regimes do not change (see Table B.3).
To examine whether the results depend on the classification of regime types, I replace
the autocracy variable in the baseline model with alternative measures. First, I use
the binary indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019) instead of the continuous measure
(Tables B.4 and B.5). For (rather) democratic countries the dummy variable has the
value zero, for (rather) autocratic regimes it takes the value one. The variable does not
turn out to be statistically significant once all fixed-effects are included in column (4).
For all other specifications, however, the point estimates remain negative and statistically
significant at a one percent-level. Second, I use the dichotomous democracy variable from
the dataset of regime types by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) and mirror it: the dummy
variable has the value zero if a country held free and fair elections with a peaceful turnover
of legislative and executive offices, otherwise the dummy variable takes the value one. All
point estimates are negative and statistically significant (see Tables B.6 and B.7). Third, I
mirror the Revised Combined Polity score derived from the Polity IV Project by Marshall
et al. (2019) and use it as an alternative autocracy measure (Tables B.8 and B.9). The
estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant in columns (1) to (3). The
point estimates remain negative, but do not turn out to be statistically significant once
all fixed effects are included in column (4). Moreover, I replace the autocracy measure
12 On how government ideology relates to political alignment with individual countries such as the United
States and China see, for example, Potrafke (2009), Strüver (2016) and Mosler and Potrafke (2020).
13 A center government serves as the reference category.
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by the Institutionalized Autocracy score of Marshall et al. (2019) which ranges from zero
(not autocratic) to ten (fully autocratic). Inferences regarding autocracy and political
alignment with Israel do not change (see Tables B.10 and B.11).
I test whether my results are biased by ‘voting noise’ in my dependent variable, which
may result from a shifting thematic focus in the UNGA over time. I replace the measure
for political alignment in the baseline specification with the absolute difference in ideal
points between Israel and UNGA member countries for the period 1950 to 2018 according
to Bailey et al. (2017). Ideal points only include voting results on UNGA resolutions
that are identical over time. They are calculated for each country on a yearly basis and
take a US-led liberal order as a reference point. Because the measure is less sensitive
to the political zeitgeist of the UNGA agenda, it captures changes in foreign policy
standpoints on recurring issues14. A higher absolute difference in ideal points indicates
a lower political alignment between a country and Israel. Again, the empirical results
suggest that the regime type matters: all point estimates of the autocracy variable are
positive and statistically significant at a one percent-level. When country- and year-fixed
effects are included in column (4), the coefficient estimate equals 0.34 or 33 percent of
a standard deviation, which implies that for resolutions that are thematically consistent
over time, autocracies are also less likely to vote in line with Israel than democratic
governments (see Table B.12).
Finally, I investigate whether the negative correlation between the level of autocracy and
voting in line with Israel depends on the choice of standard errors. I re-estimate my
baseline model using either standard errors clustered at the country-level (Tables B.13
and B.14) or the jackknife resampling method for standard error computation (Tables
B.15 and B.16) instead of Newey-West standard errors. Inferences do not change.
2.7 Conclusion
It is fair to say that voting in the United Nations General Assembly has extensively
revolved around a small Middle Eastern country: the State of Israel. About one out of five
of all contested resolutions between 1950 and 2018 was related to Israel, and nine out of
ten of these resolutions entailed criticism of the only Jewish-majority state. My empirical
results show that political institutions are related to the preoccupation of the United
Nations with Israel. Examining all resolutions that involve Israeli and/or Palestinian
issues, the average vote agreement rate with the State of Israel among fully autocratic
regimes is 3.2 percentage points or 18 percent of a standard deviation lower than among
14 Note that in the sub-sample which only includes resolutions on the State of Israel, the general tenor
of the resolutions also changes little over time.
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fully democratic governments. The difference in voting behavior is more pronounced for
resolutions that directly deal with the State of Israel, excluding Palestinian issues or
related missions by the United Nations, with an estimated decline in voting alignment of
3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation. The results are consistent
with the proposal that autocratic governments in the United Nations General Assembly
have used Israel as a decoy to deflect attention from their behavior and to avoid criticism
of their regimes.
Chapter 3
Political Alignment during the
Trump Presidency
This chapter is joint work with Niklas Potrafke and is published in International Interac-
tions (Mosler and Potrafke, 2020).
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3.1 Introduction
Prime examples of political alliances have long been the Western world and countries
that belonged to the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the Cold War, such alliances seemed
to enjoy less importance. The relationship between Western countries and the United
States of America (US) deteriorated, however, since early 2017. The president of the
US, Donald Trump, has intimidated allied countries. For example, Trump called the
Canadian prime minister “very dishonest and weak” when he left the Group of Seven
(G7)-meeting in 2018 (Trump, 2018a) and criticized European North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) members for spending too little on military expenditure (Trump,
2018b,c).
The strategic US foreign policy relative to Western partners has drastically shifted since
Donald Trump took office.1 The United States initiated a trade war putting tariffs on
goods traded with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member countries, backed out of the Iran nuclear deal prompting harsh criticism by other
Group of Seven (G7) member states, or moved its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem against
the condemnation of many members of the United Nations Group of Western European
and Other States (UN WEOG). We examine the extent to which political alignment
between the United States and allied Western countries has been affected by changes of
the substance of the United States foreign policy.2
Ameasure for political alignment is voting behavior in the United Nations General Assem-
bly (UNGA), where countries are politically aligned through common voting patterns on
resolutions. Previous studies measured political alignment by the share of (dis)agreeing
on resolutions in the UNGA, that is two countries voting with either ‘in favor’, ‘against’
or ‘abstain’ (Dreher and Jensen, 2013), or by estimating dynamic state preferences based
on UNGA voting data (Bailey et al., 2017; Bailey and Voeten, 2018). Determinants and
consequences of voting in line with the United States at the UNGA are a well-discussed
topic in political economy studies. For example, scholars show that the United States used
foreign aid to buy votes in the UNGA (Kegley Jr and Hook, 1991; Kim and Russett, 1996;
Dreher et al., 2008; Allen and Flynn, 2018; Woo and Chung, 2018; Adhikari, 2019b,a)3
1 Domestic policy in the United States has also changed since Donald Trump took office. For example,
Donald Trump influenced the domestic electoral environment with his polarizing focus on national-,
partisan- and president-centered topics (Jacobson, 2019), and high-ranking public servants have less
experience in government and policy drafting under Trump than under previous presidents of the
United States (King and Riddlesperger, 2018).
2 On how national economic conditions influence foreign policy rhetoric of presidents of the United
States, see Carter (2020).
3 On how aid is used to win a temporary seat in the UN Security Council see, for example, Reinsberg
(2019).
3.2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 44
and had a higher cooperation in intelligence service operations with countries that voted
more in line with the United States on human rights issues (Cordell, 2019). Developing
countries were also more likely to vote in line with the United States in the UNGA when
they received loans from United States-led regional development banks (Obydenkova and
Rodrigues Vieira, 2020). Countries got a more positive review from the United Nations
(UN)’s Committee against Torture when they voted in line with the United States in the
UNGA (Kahn-Nisser, 2019).
We examine the voting behavior of Western countries on resolutions in the United Nations
General Assembly in line with the United States. The data set includes resolutions over
the period 1949 until 2019. Descriptive statistics show that voting in line with the
United States was on average 7.2 percentage points (p.p.) lower under Donald Trump
than under previous presidents of the United States. The results do not suggest that
the declining voting alignment between the United States and Western allies was driven
by the ideological distance based on a classical leftwing-rightwing government ideology
scale. Rather, the United States has changed foreign policy, especially on topics related
to the Middle East.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
We use UNGA voting data prepared by Voeten (2013) for the period 1949 until 2018. We
have self-compiled UNGA vote outcomes at the delegation-resolution-level until August
2019 using United Nations (2019d). To measure political affinity, we follow related em-
pirical studies (Thacker, 1999; Dreher and Sturm, 2012) and use the vote agreement rate
between a country and the United States, which is one if both countries vote the same, 0.5
for weak deviations4, and zero for strong deviations5. Our extended sample includes all
4,911 resolutions in the UNGA since 1949 on which the United States voted.6 The vote
agreement rate serves well for descriptive purposes. It is sensitive, however, to the agenda
of resolution topics and may pick up the ‘noise of the zeitgeist’ rather than actual shifts in
foreign policy preferences. To address this issue, we also consider the absolute difference
in ideal points between the United States and allied countries until 2018 according to
Bailey et al. (2017) in our empirical model. Bailey et al. (2017) use UNGA resolutions
that were identical across years to approximate dynamic state preferences relative to a
US-led liberal order. Ideal points are thus well-suited for intertemporal comparisons.
4 We define weak deviations as votes in which one nation voted ‘in favor’ or ‘against’, while the other
nation to be compared to voted ‘abstain’.
5 Under strong deviations, we define votes in which one nation voted ‘in favor’, while the other nation
to be compared to voted ‘against’.
6 We do not consider votes on either paragraphs or amendments.
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3.2.1 Vote Agreement Rates under Presidents of the United
States
Figure 3.1 shows how often the G7, NATO, OECD and UN WEOG member countries
voted in line with the United States in the UNGA. Concordant voting between the United
States and its partners in the UNGA decreased over the last decades. In the 1960s during
the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the agreement rate was on
average above 85 percent. The UNGA vote agreement rates of Western country groups
decreased on average by around ten percentage points during the 1970s and another 20
percentage points by 1990.
Figure 3.1: Average agreement rate per year between the US and Western countries during
votes in the UNGA, all resolutions
Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions per year across all countries of each country group without the
United States is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations
The UNGA vote agreement rate has decreased since Donald Trump became president of
the United States (see Table 3.1). Since Donald Trump took office in January 2017 until
August 2019, the United States has voted on 197 resolutions. Overall, the vote agree-
ment rate of Western countries in the UNGA with the United States since January 2017
was only between 52.0 percent (OECD member states) and 56.8 percent (G7 countries).
Compared with the average of all votes before Trump took office, the consensus rate
between Western countries and the United States decreased by 7.2 percentage points.
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The weakest decline is observed among the OECD countries (-6.7 percentage points),
while the agreement rate with NATO member states had the strongest decrease (-7.9
percentage points).
We examine votes in the UNGA that took place only in the first two years of a US
presidency to determine whether the declined UNGA vote agreement rates under Donald
Trump are based on becoming acquainted with each other or whether the United States
and Western allies have politically steered away from each other (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions and
resolutions during first two years of a US presidency between April 1949 and December 2016 before Trump and between
January 2017 and August 2019 since Trump
all UNGA resolutions
before Trump’s presidency
all UNGA resolutions
during the 1st and 2nd
year of a US presidency
before Trump
all UNGA resolutions
since Trump’s presidency
G7 64.0 percent 66.6 percent 56.8 percent
N = 22,728 N = 6,840 N = 1,179
OECD 58.7 percent 61.3 percent 52.0 percent
N = 106,546 N = 31,505 N = 6,763
NATO 61.3 percent 63.5 percent 53.4 percent
N = 78,832 N = 22,178 N = 5,489
UN WEOG 59.2 percent 61.9 percent 52.2 percent
N = 104,767 N = 32,006 N = 5,481
Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions per year across all countries of each country group without the United
States is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations
The differences between Trump and other presidents of the United States are even more
pronounced for the first two years of a presidency. Newly elected presidents of the United
States enjoyed much higher agreement rates with Western partners than Trump. On
average, the agreement rate of all Western countries during Trump’s first two years of
presidency was 9.5 percentage points lower than the average agreement rate in the first
two years of the preceding presidents of the United States for all resolutions. By Western
country groups, the agreement rates were lower by 9.3 percentage points for OECD
countries and up to 10.1 percentage points for NATO member states.
Politicians are often election-motivated. Donald Trump may have wanted to gratify his
constituency rather than the international community. If this is true, lower vote agree-
ment rates since Trump took office would be based on reelection considerations rather
than fundamental policy shifts during the president’s first term. Previous agreement
rates in the first and second presidential terms do not suggest, however, that presidents
of the United States enjoyed higher political alignment in their second than their first
presidential term (Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2: Average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, resolutions during
the first and second term of presidents of the US before Trump and all resolutions since Trump
all UNGA resolutions
during the first term of a
US president before
Trump’s presidency
difference to Donald
Trump
all UNGA resolutions
during the second term of
a US president before
Trump’s presidency
G7 66.5 percent + 9.7 p.p. 60.0 percent
N = 13,926 N = 8,802
OECD 60.8 percent + 8.8 p.p. 55.6 percent
N = 63,566 N = 42,980
NATO 63.0 percent + 9.6 p.p. 59.0 percent
N = 44,904 N =33,928
UN WEOG 61.2 percent + 9.0 p.p. 56.2 percent
N = 63,614 N = 41,153
Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions per year across all countries of each country group without the United
States is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations
Vote agreement rates between the United States and Western allies were on average
higher during the first than the second presidential term before Donald Trump took
office. The largest decrease between presidential terms is observed among G7 partners
(6.5 percentage points), while the difference for NATO member countries is 4.0 percentage
points. Former presidents of the United States have seemed to seek recognition abroad
during their first term, but became less restrained by international vote alignments in
their second term. Overall, vote agreement rates during Donald Trump’s first term as
president of the United States are even lower than the average of all preceding presidents
of the United States in their first or second term.
Since the 2000s, an intriguing observation is that differences in the UNGA voting between
the United States and Western countries were smaller during Barack Obama’s presidency,
but greater during the George W. Bush administration (Table 3.3).
Vote agreement rates with Western partners in the UNGA under Donald Trump have been
4.1 (UN WEOG) to 7.0 percentage points (G7) higher than under George W. Bush. It is
conceivable that the lower agreement rate under President George W. Bush is based on his
controversial foreign policy decisions. For example, George W. Bush did not implement
the Kyoto Protocol, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and prioritized the
United States’ hegemonic supremacy over multilateral agreements within the framework
of the National Security Strategy (Jervis, 2003). Most importantly, however, George
W. Bush declared the War on Terror, which included inter alia a large-scale military
engagement in Iraq. Johnstone (2004) proposes that the United States-led Iraq War was
perceived as a major breach of the prevailing normative and institutional framework at
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Table 3.3: Average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions for
selected presidents of the US
difference to difference to
George W. Bush Donald Trump Barack Obama Donald Trump
G7 49.8 percent - 7.0 p.p. 64.2 percent + 7.4 p.p.
N = 3,686 N = 3,398
OECD 46.1 percent - 5.9 p.p. 57.6 percent + 5.6 p.p.
N = 17,710 N = 18,428
NATO 47.1 percent - 6.3 p.p. 59.1 percent + 5.7 p.p.
N = 13,789 N = 15,253
UN WEOG 48.1 percent - 4.1 p.p. 58.8 percent +6.6 p.p.
N = 17,041 N = 15,805
Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions per year across all countries of each country group without the United
States is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations
the United Nations with which most member states did not acquiesce, and thus damaged
foreign relations between the United States and other UN members.
The vote agreement rate in the UNGA during the Trump administration is smaller than
under former US president Barack Obama. Voting alignments between the United States
and its Western allies have changed since 2017. The agreement rates since Donald Trump
took office compared to Obama’s presidency decreased by 5.6 (OECD) to 7.4 percentage
points (G7). Under President Obama, the National Security Strategy was reframed to
emphasize multilateralism and global engagement. Examples of cooperation with Western
partners include international sanctions together with OECD member countries against
Russia following the Crimean crisis and a joint NATO mission to enforce a no-fly zone
over Libya. However, vote agreement rates during the presidency of Barack Obama still
just reached the previous average under US president Bill Clinton, but remained lower
than the average vote agreement rate before the 1980s.
We examine voting alignment between the United States and individual Western coun-
tries. The results suggest some heterogeneity in average agreement rates across countries
(Figure 3.2).
Overall, the average agreement rate increased in 13 Western allied countries since Donald
Trump became president of the United States. The largest increases are observed in Israel,
Hungary and the Republic of Korea. For the remaining 31 countries, average agreement
rates decreased under Donald Trump’s presidency. Especially close allied countries such
as the United Kingdom, France or Germany voted less in line with the United States
when Trump was in office.
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Figure 3.2: Average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in
the UNGA, average across all resolutions by country
Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions by country since they became part of the G7, NATO, OECD
and/or UN WEOG before and since Donald Trump took office is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations
(2019d), own calculations
3.2.2 Vote Agreement Rates by Topics
We examine the voting behavior for UNGA resolutions on six repeated issues in more
detail. Compared to all previous presidents of the United States, resolutions on human
rights and economic development were more frequent by 7.2 and 6.1 percentage points
since Donald Trump took office. The share of UNGA resolutions dealing with colonial-
ism decreased by 7.0 percentage points. For Middle Eastern, disarmament and nuclear
proliferation issues, the share of resolutions hardly changed since Donald Trump became
president.
The decline in voting alignment between the United States and Western allies could be
based on three dynamics: (1) the United States voted since 2017 as it has always done
and the Western partners have changed their foreign policy course, (2) vice versa, or
(3) the United States and its allies have both changed their foreign policy positions. We
consider topic-related resolutions to examine such voting dynamics. Individual resolutions
differ from vote to vote. If resolutions on repeated issues differ on average, however, we
would expect to observe the same shift of approval rates among the United States and
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its Western partners if their foreign policy stance did not change. Figure 3.3 shows
the percentage of resolutions on the Israel-Palestine conflict, economic development and
colonialism on which the United States and the other Western countries voted with ‘in
favor’. The results for the specific country groups (G7, OECD, NATO and UN WEOG)
are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable.
The approval rate of the United States changed for resolutions that have covered Mid-
dle Eastern topics, precisely the Israel-Palestine conflict. Israel has been discriminated
against in the UNGA for decades (Becker et al., 2015; Hillman and Potrafke, 2015; Mosler,
2020). The United States has, however, mostly voted against resolutions criticizing Israel
for the last decades. This trend has strengthened under Donald Trump: while other West-
ern countries slightly increased their approval rate on resolutions on the Israel-Palestine
conflict, the approval rate of the United States on resolutions dealing with the Middle
East declined from 16.7 percent before Trump’s presidency to 2.9 percent since Trump has
been in office. The relocation of the United States embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem
and the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights are prime examples of
the changing foreign policy of the United States regarding Middle Eastern topics.
Second, under Donald Trump the United States agreed to only 21.6 percent of all reso-
lutions regarding economic development worldwide, whereas its approval rate before the
Trump presidency was about 33.9 percent. This voting pattern of the United States
contrasts with the voting behavior of the other Western partner countries, which have
voted ‘in favor’ on almost 80 percent of the economic development resolutions since 2017,
increasing their approval rate by about 5.5 percentage points.
Third, approval of resolutions by the United States on colonialism under the Trump ad-
ministration decreased by almost 12.9 percentage points from about a quarter to slightly
above 11 percent of all votes. The voting approval rate of the other Western countries
slightly increased by 1.8 percentage points, however, to almost 75 percent.
On human rights issues, the resolution approval rate of the United States increased by
some 6.0 percentage points, while the approval rate of the Western countries only in-
creased by 2.5 percentage points. Regarding resolutions on nuclear proliferation, the
average approval rate of both the United States and Western countries decreased by
about the same order of magnitude since Donald Trump took office (-11.5 and -13.2 per-
centage points). The resolution approval rate for resolutions on disarmament decreased
by about 8.5 percentage points for the United States and by 7.0 percentage points for
Western countries.
A concern is that the general resolution content has changed since Donald Trump took
office, while resolutions are still classified into the same topic category. For example,
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Figure 3.3: Average approval rate of the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA,
all resolutions for individual topics before and since president Donald Trump
A country‘s vote as ‘in favor‘ is coded as 1, ‘abstain‘ is coded as 0.5, and ‘against‘ is coded as 0. The unweighted averages
for UNGA resolutions for the United States and across all Western countries without the United States are displayed.
Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations
3.2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 52
more human rights resolutions dealt with individual countries, especially Israel, rather
than general human rights issues, and the United States under Donald Trump put for-
ward new topics such as condemning Hamas for using own-population human shields and
firing rockets at civilian targets in Israel (Hillman, 2019; Jelnov, 2019). We examine two
repeated issues in the UNGA: resolutions about the status of Jerusalem and the Golan
Heights. The United States did not vote ‘in favor’ on a single resolution dealing with
the status of Jerusalem since 2017, down from an approval rate of about a third before
Trump’s presidency. In contrast, the approval rate of Western countries for resolutions
about Jerusalem remained almost unchanged at 95 percent before and 92 percent after
Donald Trump took office. Similarly, the United States decreased its approval rate for
Golan Heights resolutions from 28 percent to 13 percent after the Trump presidency,
while Western countries maintained an approval rate of 77 percent and 72 percent before
and after the Trump presidency.
Overall, the results suggest that the United States stance on foreign policy, especially on
Middle Eastern topics, has changed under Donald Trump.
3.2.3 Did especially leftwing Western governments turn away?
Previous studies have shown that political alignment between the United States and
other countries was pronounced when government ideology in the United States and
other countries were aligned. For example, leftwing governments in OECD countries
were more likely to vote in line with the United States in the UNGA when the president
of the United States was a Democrat rather than a Republican (Potrafke, 2009).7 We
examine whether leftwing governments in Western countries were less likely to vote in
line with the United States since Donald Trump took office than rightwing governments.
We estimate the following baseline panel model:
Yit,m =α ∗ Trumpt + β ∗ ideologicaldistanceit + γ ∗ Trumpt ∗ ideologicaldistanceit
+
10∑
l=1
γl ×Xit,l + Yit−1,m + µi + εit,m
where Y are m = 1, 2 dependent variables measuring the political alignment between
the United States and country i in year t, namely the yearly average of the resolution
agreement rate in the UNGA with the vote of the United States and the yearly absolute
difference of ideal points between the United States and Western partners in the UNGA.
7 On ideology-induced policies in OECD countries see, for example, Potrafke (2017, 2018)
3.2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 53
Trump is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if Donald Trump was president
of the United States in year t and zero otherwise8.
Ideologicaldistance measures the distance in the political ideology between country i’s
executive leader and the president of the United States in year t. It assumes the value
one if a country’s leader is leftwing and the president of the United States is a Republican
or if a country’s leader is right-wing and a president of the United States is a Democrat,
0.5 if a country’s leader is moderate-center, and zero otherwise. We measure the political
ideology of country i’s chief executive with data by Cruz et al. (2018) and self-compile
data for the years 2018 and 2019. We expect the correlation between the ideological
distance of Western chief executives and the president of the United States and voting in
line with the United States to be negative.
Xit,l contains l = 1, ..,10 control variables. Following related studies (Dreher and Jensen,
2013; Smith, 2016), we include real GDP per capita in logarithmic terms, growth of real
GDP per capita, and population in logarithmic terms. We consider data provided by
IMF (2019) that starts in the year 1980 and is available till the year 2019 as an estimate.
We include a dummy variable taking the value one if a Western country was a military
ally with the United States in an armed conflict according to Pettersson et al. (2019),
and zero otherwise.9 We also include the shares of resolutions a country voted on in
year t that dealt with six individual topics: the Middle East, economic development,
disarmament, human rights, nuclear proliferation and colonialism. We include the first
lag of the dependent variable to account for serial correlation.
µ are country-fixed effects. ε is the error term. Standard errors are robust.
Table C.1 presents summary statistics of the individual variables.
Table 3.4 shows the regression results for the yearly average agreement rate on resolutions
between 1980 and 2019.
Since Donald Trump took office as president of the United States, the vote agreement rate
of Western countries with the United States on UNGA resolutions has decreased compared
to the voting behavior of all previous presidents. When control variables are included,
the coefficient estimates of the Trump dummy variable are negative and statistically
significant at the one percent-level in columns (2) to (5). When the country-fixed effects
and topic-share variables are not included [column (2)], the coefficient estimate suggests
that the decrease in vote agreement rates since Donald Trump took office is 4.9 percentage
8 There was no roll-call vote in the UNGA between 1 January 2017 and Donald Trump’s inauguration
as US president on 20 January 2017.
9 No Western country was a military opponent of the United States in an armed conflict according to
Pettersson et al. (2019).
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Table 3.4: Yearly average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions
between 1980 and 2019
Dependent variable:
yearly average agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US president Donald Trump 0.0122 -0.0491*** -0.0515*** -0.0563*** -0.0440***
(0.0195) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0112) (0.0127)
Ideological distance 0.0021 0.0028 0.0023 0.0020 0.0020
(0.0038) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
US president Donald Trump -0.0271** -0.0041 -0.0041 0.0006 0.0002
times ideological distance (0.0121) (0.0085) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0071)
Log of real GDP per capita 0.0103** 0.0077* -0.0108 -0.0171
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0124) (0.0152)
Growth of real GDP -0.0036*** -0.0038*** -0.0037*** -0.0035***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Log of population 0.0004 0.0002 0.1392*** 0.1205***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0327) (0.0331)
Allied with US in conflict 0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0150*** -0.0125***
(0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0044)
1st lag of UNGA vote 0.8562*** 0.8596*** 0.6908*** 0.6735***
agreement rate (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0246) (0.0258)
Constant 0.5432*** -0.0240 -0.0726 -0.1506 -0.0857
(0.0050) (0.0446) (0.0507) (0.0931) (0.1419)
Topic-share variables? 7 7 X 7 X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X X
Conditional marginal effect -0.0251** -0.0013 -0.0018 0.0026 0.0021
of ideological distancea. (0.0114) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0068)
Observations 1,059 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020
Countries 38 38 38 38 38
Adjusted R2 0.0024 0.7788 0.7844 0.8000 0.8042
Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
Only countries that have been either G7, NATO, OECD and/or UN WEOG members without the US are included.
Note a.: Conditional marginal effects evaluated at president Trump dummy variable taking value of 1,
and control variables at means.
points. Once the topic-share variables and country-fixed effects are included, the point
estimate increases to around -4.4 percentage points [column (5)]. The point estimates
of the ideological difference variable do not turn out to be statistically significant. The
coefficient estimate of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant in
column (1), but lacks statistical significance in all other columns. The marginal effect of
the ideological distance during the Donald Trump administration in column (1) without
control variables is statistically significant at the five percent-level and suggests that the
agreement rate was around 2.5 percentage points lower when the ideological distance
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increased by one point. Once control variables are included in columns (2) to (5), the
marginal effects of the ideological distance lack statistical significance.
Table 3.5 shows the results if the dependent variable is replaced by the absolute difference
of ideal points between the United States and Western countries in the UNGA for the
period 1980 until 2018.
Table 3.5: Yearly absolute difference of ideal points between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA,
all resolutions between 1980 and 2018
Dependent variable:
absolute difference of ideal points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US president Donald Trump -0.0794 0.0954*** 0.1155*** 0.1168*** 0.1411***
(0.0906) (0.0226) (0.0276) (0.0222) (0.0276)
Ideological distance 0.0072 -0.0053 -0.0034 -0.0007 0.0001
(0.0160) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0053)
US president Donald Trump 0.1013 0.0146 0.0116 -0.0004 0.0000
times ideological distance (0.0622) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0145)
Log of real GDP per capita -0.0284** -0.0152 0.0379 0.1040**
(0.0123) (0.0120) (0.0394) (0.0450)
Growth of real GDP 0.0032 0.0019 0.0037 -0.0010
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Log of population -0.0037 -0.0029 -0.3431*** -0.3060***
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0885) (0.0904)
Allied with US in conflict -0.0250*** 0.0044 0.0121 0.0411***
(0.0095) (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0124)
1st lag of absolute 0.9131*** 0.9243*** 0.7493*** 0.7171***
ideal points difference (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0270) (0.0288)
Constant 1.6361*** 0.4590*** 0.6767*** 1.0876*** 0.7655*
(0.0216) (0.1339) (0.1541) (0.3033) (0.4161)
Topic-share variables? 7 7 X 7 X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X X
Conditional marginal effect 0.1086* 0.0093 0.0083 -0.0011 0.0001
of ideological distancea. (0.0601) (0.0142) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0134)
Observations 1,031 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020
Countries 38 38 38 38 38
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.8984 0.9029 0.9094 0.9145
Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
Only countries that have been either G7, NATO, OECD and/or UN WEOG members without the US are included.
Note a.: Conditional marginal effects evaluated at president Trump dummy variable taking value of 1,
and control variables at means.
The point estimates of the Donald Trump dummy variable are positive and statistically
significant at the one percent-level in columns (2) to (5). The coefficient estimates range
between 0.10 in column (2) and 0.14 in column (5), or about a quarter of a standard
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deviation, with fixed country effects and the topic-share variables included. The point
estimates of the ideological distance variable and of its interaction with the Donald Trump
dummy variable do not turn out to be statistically significant. The marginal effect of the
ideological distance under Donald Trump is positive and statistically significant at the
ten percent-level in column (1), but lacks statistical significance once control variables
are included.
As a robustness check, we exclude individual countries from the Western countries group.
Inferences for both political alignment variables do not change. Inferences also do not
change if only G7, OECD, NATO or UN WEOG member countries are considered.
We do not find evidence that Donald Trump’s cabinet members obstructed the president’s
policy decisions at the UNGA. The longest-serving ambassador of the United States to
the United Nations under Donald Trump, Nikki Haley, publicly supported the president’s
agenda (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2017) and did not state dissent as
a reason for her resignation (Haley, 2018). Acting ambassador of the United States to
the United Nations Jonathan Cohen, a career diplomat who followed Haley in February
2019, defended the United States policy shift at the United Nations on topics such as the
Iranian nuclear deal (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019a) and the Golan
Heights (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019b).
3.3 Conclusion
Voting in line with the United States of Western country groups at the United Nations
General Assembly declined since Donald Trump’s presidency. The decrease is especially
pronounced for member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and topics
regarding the Middle East. Econometric evidence suggests that the vote agreement rate
of Western countries under Donald Trump decreased by 4.4 percentage points and that
absolute ideal point differences increased by 25 percent of a standard deviation compared
to preceding presidents of the United States.
One may well conjecture that leftwing governments in Western allied countries are espe-
cially inclined to vote against the United States of America since Donald Trump became
president. Our results, however, do not suggest that the declining political alignment be-
tween the United States and Western allies was driven by the ideological distance based
on a classical leftwing-rightwing government ideology scale.
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A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Seating arrangements at the first annual meeting of the International Labour
Conference in Washington, D.C., United States, 1919
Source: International Labour Organization (2021)
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Figure A.2: Seating arrangements at the first Assembly of the League of Nations at the Salle
de la Réformation in Geneva, Switzerland, 1920
Source: Frankl (1920)
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Figure A.3: Seating arrangements at the first session of the UNGA at Methodist Central Hall
in London, United Kingdom, 1946
Source: United Nations (2021d)
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Figure A.4: Seating arrangements at the session of the UNGA at Flushing Meadows in New
York City, United States, 1950
Source: United Nations (2021e)
A.1. FIGURES 69
Figure A.5: Seating arrangements at the third session of the UNGA at the Palais de Chaillot
in Paris, France, 1949
Source: United Nations (2021d)
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Figure A.6: Seating arrangements at the eighth session of the UNGA in the General Assembly
Hall in New York City, United States, 1953
Source: United Nations (2021d)
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Figure A.7: Seating arrangements at the 68th session of the UNGA at the North Lawn Building
in New York City, United States, 2013
Source: United Nations (2021f)
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Figure A.8: Seating arrangements at the 74th session of the UNGA in the General Assembly
Hall, 2019
Source: United Nations (2021d)
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Figure A.9: Vote display panels at UNGA in the General Assembly Hall, 2021
Source: United Nations (2021d)
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Figure A.10: Seating arrangements at the 75th session of the UNGA in the General Assembly
Hall, 2020
Source: United Nations (2021f)
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Figure A.11: Floor plan of the 37th session of the UNGA
Source: United Nations (2019b)
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: List of seating arrangements since the seventh session of the UNGA
Seating arrangement First date Reason for change of seating order
1st arrangement, 7th session 2 October 1952 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 8th session 7 September 1953 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 9th session 2 September 1954 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 10th session 3 September 1955 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 10th session 1 December 1955 first vote of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal,
Portugal, Romania and Spain
1st arrangement, 11th session 1 November 1956 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 11th session 2 December 1956 first vote of Japan
3rd arrangement, 11th session 4 March 1957 first vote of Ghana
1st arrangement, 12th session 3 September 1957 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 13th session 3 September 1958 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 13th session 1 December 1958 first vote of Guinea
1st arrangement, 14th session 5 September 1959 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 15th session 6 September 1960 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 15th session 1 October 1960 first vote of Nigeria
1st arrangement, 16th session 1 August 1961 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 16th session 7 September 1961 first vote of Sierra Leone
3rd arrangement, 16th session 2 October 1961 first vote of Mauritania and Mongolia
4th arrangement, 16th session 1 December 1961 first vote of Tanganyika
1st arrangement, 17th session 5 July 1962 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 17th session 1 September 1962 first vote of Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda
and Trinidad & Tobago
3rd arrangement, 17th session 4 October 1962 first vote of Algeria and Uganda
1st arrangement, 18th session 4 June 1963 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 18th session 1 October 1963 country name change to Malaysia
No data available for seating arrangement of 18th session before first votes of Kenya and Zanzibar.
1st arrangement, 19th session 6 February 1965 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 20th session 3 November 1965 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 21st session 4 September 1966 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 21st session 4 October 1966 first vote of Botswana and Lesotho
3rd arrangement, 21st session 3 December 1966 first vote of Barbados
1st arrangement, 22nd session 3 September 1967 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 22nd session 1 December 1967 first vote of Southern Yemen
3rd arrangement, 22nd session 3 June 1968 first vote of Mauritius
1st arrangement, 23rd session 6 September 1968 beginning of session
Continuation on next page.
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Continuation from previous page.
Seating arrangement First date Reason for change of seating order
2nd arrangement, 23rd session 1 November 1968 first vote of Equatorial Guinea
1st arrangement, 24th session 1 September 1969 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 25th session 1 September 1970 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 25th session 25 July 1970 country name change to Khmer Republic
3rd arrangement, 25th session 1 December 1970 country name change to People’s
Democratic Republic of Yemen
1st arrangement, 26th session 2 September 1971 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 26th session 3 October 1971 first vote of Oman
3rd arrangement, 26th session 3 November 1971 country name change to Zaire
4th arrangement, 26th session 1 December 1971 country name change to Congo and
first vote of United Arab Emirates
1st arrangement, 27th session 5 September 1972 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 28th session 1 October 1973 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 29th session 2 September 1974 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 29th session 2 December 1974 country name change to Benin
1st arrangement, 30th session 1 November 1975 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 30th session 3 December 1975 first vote of Suriname
1st arrangement, 31st session 4 October 1976 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 31st session 1 December 1976 first vote of Samoa
1st arrangement, 32nd session 5 October 1977 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 33rd session 1 November 1978 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 33rd session 1 December 1978 first vote of Dominica
1st arrangement, 34th session 5 September 1979 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 35th session 1 October 1980 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 36th session 1 September 1981 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 36th session 2 November 1981 first vote of Antigua and Barbuda
1st arrangement, 37th session 3 October 1982 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 38th session 4 October 1983 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 39th session 5 September 1984 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 40th session 6 October 1985 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 41st session 2 October 1986 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 42nd session 4 October 1987 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 43rd session 2 October 1988 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 44th session 5 September 1989 beginning of session
No data available for seating arrangements between the 45th and 51st session.
1st arrangement, 52nd session 3 November 1997 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 53rd session 2 October 1998 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 53rd session 8 June 1999 first vote of Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga
1st arrangement, 54th session 2 November 1999 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 54th session 15 June 2000 first vote of Tuvalu
1st arrangement, 55th session 3 October 2000 beginning of session
Continuation on next page.
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Seating arrangement First date Reason for change of seating order
1st arrangement, 56th session 4 November 2001 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 57th session 3 September 2002 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 57th session 5 June 2003 country name change to
Serbia & Montenegro
1st arrangement, 58th session 4 November 2003 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 59th session 22 October 2004 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 60th session 31 October 2005 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 60th session 30 June 2006 first vote of Montenegro
1st arrangement, 61st session 30 October 2006 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 62nd session 30 October 2007 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 63rd session 8 October 2008 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 64th session 28 October 2009 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 65th session 26 October 2010 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 65th session 3 May 2011 first vote of South Sudan
1st arrangement, 66th session 16 September 2011 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 67th session 13 November 2012 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 68th session 29 October 2013 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 69th session 28 October 2014 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 70th session 27 October 2015 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 71st session 26 October 2016 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 72nd session 1 November 2017 beginning of session
1st arrangement, 73rd session 16 October 2018 beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 73rd session 22 May 2019 country name change to
Northern Macedonia
The first date refers to the first contested vote on a resolution for each seating arrangement.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics of variables, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Vote agreement rate 79,742,480 82.4863 31.3476 0 100
General seat neighbor 79,742,480 0.048 0.2137 0 1
Table neighbor 79,742,480 0.0061 0.0779 0 1
Aisle neighbor 79,742,480 0.0059 0.0768 0 1
Diagonal front 79,742,480 0.0061 0.0776 0 1
table neighbor
Diagonal back 79,742,480 0.0061 0.0776 0 1
table neighbor
Diagonal front 79,742,480 0.0059 0.0766 0 1
aisle neighbor
Diagonal back 79,742,480 0.0059 0.0767 0 1
aisle neighbor
Front neighbor 79,742,480 0.006 0.0772 0 1
Back neighbor 79,742,480 0.006 0.0773 0 1
Continuous democracy 70,952,536 0.5228 0.4185 0 1
index by Gründler
and Krieger (2019)
Difference of cont. democr. 69,168,117 0.3991 0.3657 0 0.9995
index by Gründler
and Krieger (2019)
Communism indicator 76,583,255 0.0942 0.2921 0 1
Difference of 75,570,438 0.1612 0.3677 0 1
communism indicator
Middle East 79,742,480 0.1778 0.3823 0 1
resolution indicator
Nuclear proliferation 79,742,480 0.17 0.3756 0 1
resolution indicator
Disarmament 79,742,480 0.2143 0.4103 0 1
resolution indicator
Human rights 79,742,480 0.2002 0.4002 0 1
resolution indicator
Colonialism 79,742,480 0.1413 0.3484 0 1
resolution indicator
Economic development 79,742,480 0.1312 0.3376 0 1
resolution indicator
Number of days since 79,742,480 121.0257 64.8921 0 245
first vote on a
contested resolution
Difference of number of 79,742,480 47.0976 45.315 0 214
days since first vote on
a contested resolution
Non-permanent UN Security 79,742,480 0.0655 0.2475 0 1
Council membership
Difference of non-permanent 79,742,480 0.1197 0.3246 0 11
UN Security Council
membership
Female executive state 79,742,480 0.0632 0.2434 0 1
leader indicator
Difference of female exec. 79,742,480 0.1173 0.3218 0 1
state leader indicator
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female Minister of Foreign 79,742,480 0.0693 0.2539 0 1
Affairs indicator
Difference of female 79,742,480 0.1218 0.327 0 1
Minister of Foreign
Affairs indicator
Female Permanent 79,742,480 0.0731 0.2604 0 1
Representative to the
UN indicator
Difference of female 79,742,480 0.1304 0.3368 0 1
Permanent Representative
to the UN indicator
Growth of real GDP by 66,302,996 4.4591 9.0885 -71.0986 132.0176
Feenstra et al. (2015)
Difference of growth of real 58,225,030 8.1729 9.0828 0 142.33
GDP by
Feenstra et al. (2015)
Real GDP per capita by 66,417,785 12,626.35 17,157.18 425.3024 25,3329.9
Feenstra et al. (2015)
Difference of real GDP 58,392,477 14,073.85 19,320.9 0.05 25,2710.6
per capita by
Feenstra et al. (2015)
Population by 66,417,785 29.6593 93.5798 0.041 1,339.18
Feenstra et al. (2015)
Difference of population 58,392,477 44.8589 123.3851 0 13,39.125
by Feenstra et al. (2015)
Standardized Levensthein 71,704,504 0.1463 0.1019 0 0.7895
distance
SoundEx indicator 71,704,504 0.0014 0.0386 0 1
Row number 79,651,501 8.2151 3.7092 1 16
Column number 79,651,501 2.8953 1.5387 1 11
Vote agreement rate 65,006,973 89.8501 30.1988 0 100
without abstentions
Table neighbor’s 51,348,831 0.0057 0.0756 0 1
aisle neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s 51,348,831 0.0057 0.0756 0 1
table neighbor
Front neighbor’s 51,348,831 0.0058 0.0763 0 1
front neighbor
Back neighbor’s 51,348,831 0.0059 0.0763 0 1
back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s table 51,348,831 0.0057 0.0756 0 1
neighbor’s front neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s table 51,348,831 0.0058 0.0758 0 1
neighbor’s back neighbor
Table neighbor’s front 51,348,831 0.006 0.0769 0 1
neighbor’s front neighbor
Table neighbor’s back 51,348,831 0.006 0.077 0 1
neighbor’s back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s front 51,348,831 0.0057 0.0754 0 1
neighbor’s front neighbor
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Aisle neighbor’s back 51,348,831 0.0058 0.0757 0 1
neighbor’s back neighbor
Table neighbor’s aisle 51,348,831 0.0058 0.0756 0 1
neighbor’s front neighbor
Table neighbor’s aisle 51,348,831 0.0058 0.0757 0 1
neighbor’s back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s table 51,348,831 0.0057 0.0754 0 1
neighbor’s front neighbor’s
front neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s table 51,348,831 0.0058 0.0757 0 1
neighbor’s back neighbor’s
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s aisle 51,348,831 0.0057 0.0756 0 1
neighbor’s front neighbor’s
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s aisle 51,348,831 0.0058 0.0757 0 1
neighbor’s back neighbor’s
back neighbor
Dichotomous democracy 70,952,536 0.5257 0.4876 0 1
index by Gründler
and Krieger (2019)
Difference of dicht. democr. 69,168,117 0.4289 0.4716 0 1
index by Gründler
and Krieger (2019)
Revised Combined 68,590,853 1.3635 7.4157 -10 10
Polity score
Difference of Revised 60,428,412 7.4658 6.3498 0 20
Combined Polity score
Institutionalized Autocracy 66,973,435 3.1411 3.5155 0 10
score
Difference of Institutionalized 57,612,365 3.2925 3.1594 0 10
autocracy score
Democracy indicator by 76,583,255 0.4904 0.4999 0 1
Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)
Difference of democracy 75,570,438 0.4635 0.4987 0 1
index by Bjøornskov
and Rode (2019)
Growth of real GDP by 63,019,487 204.3688 8.468 133.629 324.7044
Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)
Difference of growth of real 54,685,899 7.5228 8.5754 0 144.1335
GDP by Bolt and
Van Zanden (2014)
Real GDP per capita by 63,079,667 12,087.91 16,371.29 269 22,0717
Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)
Difference of real GDP per 54,784,748 13,173.88 17,674.17 0 22,0055
capita by Bolt and
Van Zanden (2014)
Population by 63,572,534 31,016.23 89,981.25 64 126,8155
Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)
Difference of population by 55,731,578 45,806.56 117,802.2 0 126,8081
Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)
Same language 79,742,480 0.191 0.3931 0 1
Same colonizer 79,742,480 0.0803 0.2718 0 1
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Table A.3: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: second circle seating neighbors
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor’s -0.5587*** -0.8805*** -0.6882*** -0.6202*** -0.4814** -0.2947
aisle neighbor (0.1990) (0.2006) (0.1843) (0.2041) (0.2199) (0.2358)
Aisle neighbor’s -0.1100 -0.4926*** -0.3291** -0.3579 -0.2960 -0.1642
table neighbor (0.1960) (0.1831) (0.1614) (0.2222) (0.2271) (0.1454)
Front neighbor’s -0.5161** -0.7688*** -0.6491*** -0.5172** -0.6109** -0.0785
front neighbor (0.2205) (0.2171) (0.1988) (0.2497) (0.2663) (0.1909)
Back neighbor’s -0.2932 -0.4942** -0.3591* -0.3448 -0.4929* 0.0015
back neighbor (0.2011) (0.2046) (0.1903) (0.2258) (0.2652) (0.1793)
Aisle neighbor’s -0.1393 -0.5004* -0.3802 0.0524 0.0638 0.1946
table neighbor’s (0.2664) (0.2609) (0.2406) (0.2837) (0.3105) (0.2333)
front neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s 0.0665 -0.3832 -0.2759 0.0394 -0.1584 0.2239
table neighbor’s (0.2575) (0.2546) (0.2265) (0.2414) (0.2495) (0.1778)
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s -0.2822 -0.6666*** -0.5450** -0.3923 -0.4620 -0.0753
front neighbor’s (0.2225) (0.2506) (0.2290) (0.2771) (0.3235) (0.2284)
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s -0.1667 -0.4194 -0.2942 -0.2780 -0.3381 -0.0948
back neighbor’s (0.2235) (0.2633) (0.2400) (0.2696) (0.2978) (0.2236)
back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s -0.1035 -0.5877*** -0.4545** -0.2406 -0.2593 -0.0198
front neighbor’s (0.2077) (0.2048) (0.1854) (0.2102) (0.2178) (0.1717)
front neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s -0.4511* -0.4744** -0.4131** -0.4098 -0.4983 -0.4158
back neighbor’s (0.2341) (0.217) (0.1931) (0.2937) (0.2618) (0.2702)
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s -0.0768 -0.4875** -0.3428* -0.1528 -0.2420 0.2621
aisle neighbor’s (0.2486) (0.2226) (0.2018) (0.1988) (0.2276) (0.1988)
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s -0.2660 -0.5344** -0.3871* -0.1851 -0.1957 0.2148
aisle neighbor’s (0.2239) (0.2406) (0.2202) (0.1899) (0.2123) (0.1779)
back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s 0.1699 -0.3319 -0.2087 -0.1506 -0.2031 0.2621
table neighbor’s (0.2404) (0.2249) (0.1957) (0.1717) (0.2186) (0.1727)
front neighbor’s
front neighbor
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aisle neighbor’s 0.1332 -0.3764* -0.2531 -0.0882 -0.2679 0.2873*
table neighbor’s (0.2295) (0.2228) (0.1958) (0.2246) (0.2231) (0.1701)
back neighbor’s
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s -0.1283 -0.6540*** -0.5181** -0.1783 -0.1554 0.2415*
aisle neighbor’s (0.2467) (0.2285) (0.1959) (0.2086) (0.2315) (0.1405)
front neighbor’s
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s 0.2687 -0.2336 -0.0978 -0.1103 -0.2716 0.2169
aisle neighbor’s (0.2034) (0.2023) (0.1833) (0.2187) (0.2650) (0.1885)
back neighbor’s
back neighbor
Constant 82.5527*** 90.8731*** 88.9891*** 90.3334*** 88.7806*** 603.7411***
(0.3706) (0.8828) (1.2446) (1.0719) (1.2200) (108.2045)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 48,932,180 41,376,527 41,376,527 33,549,594 29,790,959 29,790,959
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0423 0.0440 0.0547 0.0553 0.1487
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.4: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: second circle seating neighbors
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor’s 0.0347 -0.7834 -0.1629 -0.1905 0.5523 0.5660
aisle neighbor (0.8256) (0.9060) (0.8871) (1.0136) (1.1517) (0.4552)
Aisle neighbor’s -0.3388 -0.2183 0.3704 0.1974 1.5606 0.9905
table neighbor (0.7978) (0.8333) (0.8025) (0.9449) (1.1386) (0.951)
Front neighbor’s 0.9946 0.6652 0.7271 0.8611 0.3866 -0.1453
front neighbor (0.5957) (0.4967) (0.5088) (0.5890) (0.6674) (0.4257)
Back neighbor’s 2.1920*** 1.0925 1.5143** 2.1649*** 2.4939*** 0.2654
back neighbor (0.7073) (0.6755) (0.6604) (0.7945) (0.8414) (0.2900)
Aisle neighbor’s -1.9580** -0.7697 -0.1457 -0.0913 0.1788 -0.5533
table neighbor’s (0.9712) (0.8744) (0.8549) (0.9403) (1.0922) (0.4711)
front neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s 1.5963* 0.4121 0.7725 0.4605 0.3903 -0.3265
table neighbor’s (0.8491) (0.8570) (0.8462) (0.9612) (1.0522) (0.3986)
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s 0.4161 -0.1602 0.0948 0.2062 1.1486 -0.4874
front neighbor’s (0.5969) (0.5719) (0.6127) (0.6825) (0.9211) (0.4473)
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s 0.5897 0.1740 0.5004 0.5110 0.3523 -0.6649
back neighbor’s (0.8446) (0.8680) (0.8921) (0.9858) (1.1840) (0.6446)
back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s 0.0134 1.2415** 1.6430*** 2.4094*** 2.8312*** 0.5712
front neighbor’s (0.8172) (0.5362) (0.5077) (0.5467) (0.6248) (0.4282)
front neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s 0.1068 -0.7795 -0.3293 -0.0722 -0.8056 -0.2926
back neighbor’s (0.7467) (0.7606) (0.7437) (0.7393) (0.8587) (0.4595)
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s -1.1634 -0.1151 0.6496 0.7476 0.9772 -0.6217
aisle neighbor’s (0.9747) (0.7215) (0.6762) (0.7606) (0.7084) (0.4228)
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s 1.8986** 1.1417* 1.7175*** 1.4756** 1.5963** 0.8083*
aisle neighbor’s (0.7565) (0.6746) (0.6215) (0.6512) (0.6981) (0.4687)
back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s 0.5558 -0.6562 -0.0554 0.0150 -0.1216 -0.5065*
table neighbor’s (0.7292) (0.8293) (0.8314) (0.8834) (0.9699) (0.2623)
front neighbor’s
front neighbor
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aisle neighbor’s -1.2392 -1.9205 -1.4711 -1.5400 -2.6841* -0.7739
table neighbor’s (1.0836) (1.1477) (1.1145) (1.2408) (1.3515) (0.5007)
back neighbor’s
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s 0.4545 -0.2381 0.1589 0.0308 -0.0749 -0.2482
aisle neighbor’s (0.8771) (0.8403) (0.7689) (0.9436) (0.9763) (0.3181)
front neighbor’s
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s -0.3503 -0.1457 0.5195 0.9609 0.2178 -0.0391
aisle neighbor’s (0.8522) (0.7811) (0.7368) (0.7914) (0.9555) (0.5952)
back neighbor’s
back neighbor
Constant 90.3917*** 98.5097*** 91.3948*** 90.9145*** 90.1304*** 333.4252***
(0.3524) (0.4272) (1.0557) (1.1049) (1.1087) (95.1566)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,061,742 928,695 928,695 749,022 652,718 652,718
Adjusted R2 0.0002 0.0626 0.0836 0.0879 0.0899 0.4009
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.5: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: second circle seating neighbors
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor’s -0.7725 0.0387 0.8571 0.3446 -3.6424*** 0.2962
aisle neighbor (1.2372) (0.9032) (0.8752) (1.0390) (1.2501) (1.1441)
Aisle neighbor’s -2.8834*** -0.8831 -0.2931 0.4816 -2.6284*** 0.3350
table neighbor (0.9347) (0.8369) (0.8027) (0.9615) (0.9497) (0.7916)
Front neighbor’s -4.4857*** -2.4545* -1.9864 -2.8824** -2.8852** -0.2415
front neighbor (1.1949) (1.2977) (1.2999) (1.3716) (1.3930) (1.0931)
Back neighbor’s -1.0837 -0.4744 0.4040 0.6982 0.4238 0.6861
back neighbor (0.8961) (0.9648) (0.8882) (0.9011) (1.0718) (0.8657)
Aisle neighbor’s -1.8266 0.2050 0.4731 1.6044 1.7976* 1.2027*
table neighbor’s (1.2243) (1.1760) (0.9937) (0.9840) (1.0123) (0.6853)
front neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s -4.7609*** -3.6535*** -2.5002*** -2.4299*** -2.7743*** -1.3554**
table neighbor’s (1.0760) (1.0138) (0.7955) (0.7423) (0.7929) (0.6569)
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s 0.4972 0.3760 0.9318 0.0182 -0.6343 0.3722
front neighbor’s (1.2202) (1.0824) (0.9647) (0.8490) (1.0602) (0.6770)
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s -0.5719 -0.7826 -0.1331 0.2460 0.4045 0.7609
back neighbor’s (1.4579) (1.3427) (1.0888) (1.1144) (1.2531) (0.8314)
back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s -2.3881* -1.7639 -0.8078 0.3873 -1.0596 1.2041
front neighbor’s (1.2132) (1.1860) (1.0297) (1.1951) (1.3024) (1.0117)
front neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s -2.0769 -2.2274* -1.3342 -1.1909 -1.3561 -0.5930
back neighbor’s (1.4530) (1.1236) (1.0610) (1.0588) (1.3162) (0.9148)
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s 0.0806 1.0492 1.8414** 1.0799 1.2938 0.9972
aisle neighbor’s (0.7578) (0.7809) (0.7519) (0.7201) (0.7813) (0.9681)
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s -3.3591*** -2.8983*** -1.6153* -1.9304* -1.2629 -1.3194
aisle neighbor’s (1.1416) (1.0263) (0.8479) (1.0025) (1.1088) (0.9094)
back neighbor
Aisle neighbor’s -3.4043*** -1.9314* -1.1736 -1.5780 -1.3705 -0.2521
table neighbor’s (1.2427) (1.1198) (1.0621) (0.9755) (1.0726) (0.8749)
front neighbor’s
front neighbor
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aisle neighbor’s -0.8037 -0.6850 0.1249 -0.0936 -0.5044 -0.4850
table neighbor’s (1.0715) (0.9856) (0.8907) (1.0484) (1.2203) (0.9338)
back neighbor’s
back neighbor
Table neighbor’s -2.6998** -1.4488 -0.6399 -1.2775 -1.2346 -0.7475
aisle neighbor’s (1.2346) (1.0423) (1.0864) (1.2638) (1.3058) (1.0023)
front neighbor’s
front neighbor
Table neighbor’s -1.1480 -1.1066 -0.3461 0.2467 -0.2366 -0.1827
aisle neighbor’s (1.2412) (1.2504) (1.1799) (1.2008) (1.1359) (0.8043)
back neighbor’s
back neighbor
Constant 66.1883*** 57.9539*** 52.4749*** 63.0923*** 62.4804*** 1,419.1480
(1.6259) (5.4244) (5.6255) (6.0296) (6.7145) (955.3383)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 386,580 343,858 343,858 306,530 282,631 282,631
Adjusted R2 0.0004 0.0715 0.1224 0.2285 0.2333 0.3257
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.6: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat adjacency
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.1741 0.2366 0.2454 0.2342 -0.3393** -0.3226**
(0.2054) (0.1833) (0.1537) (0.1568) (0.1564) (0.1256)
Aisle neighbor -0.1396 0.4927** 0.5645*** 0.5076*** -0.0258 -0.0524
(0.1954) (0.1879) (0.1592) (0.1702) (0.1781) (0.1635)
Diagonal front -0.5340*** -0.3667* -0.3576** 0.0081 0.0755 -0.1004
table neighbor (0.1908) (0.1895) (0.1529) (0.1463) (0.1794) (0.1355)
Diagonal back -0.4104** -0.2163 -0.1956 0.1355 0.2254 0.0091
table neighbor (0.1895) (0.1712) (0.1405) (0.1429) (0.1651) (0.1387)
Diagonal front -0.3439 -0.2020 -0.1391 0.1220 0.1160 -0.0839
aisle neighbor (0.2121) (0.2033) (0.1720) (0.1829) (0.1942) (0.1283)
Diagonal back -0.3409* -0.2624 -0.1960 -0.0006 0.0215 -0.1015
aisle neighbor (0.2008) (0.1864) (0.1586) (0.1752) (0.1802) (0.1266)
Front neighbor -0.5890*** -0.1820 -0.1874 0.2941* 0.3680* 0.1863
(0.1560) (0.1869) (0.1579) (0.1716) (0.2134) (0.1483)
Back neighbor -0.6229*** -0.2145 -0.2235 0.1257 0.2577 0.1829
(0.1323) (0.1611) (0.1409) (0.1406) (0.1807) (0.1411)
Constant 82.4871*** 89.8420*** 86.5917*** 88.8063*** 87.0226*** 512.1063***
(0.4132) (1.0106) (1.4749) (1.2238) (1.4052) (117.7021)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 15,339,3450 13,549,9065 13,549,906 11,079,597 9,811,188 9,811,188
Adjusted R2 0.0000 0.0378 0.0416 0.0541 0.0558 0.1505
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.7: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat
adjacency
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.8222 1.1467** 1.5549*** 1.8530*** 2.2906*** -0.0618
(0.5086) (0.4515) (0.4351) (0.4327) (0.4101) (0.2611)
Aisle neighbor -0.1699 1.5355*** 2.2972*** 2.9950*** 3.8678*** 0.9306***
(0.4498) (0.3801) (0.3746) (0.4207) (0.4015) (0.2366)
Diagonal front 0.7923 1.0621** 1.0601** 1.2397** 1.3533** 0.2386
table neighbor (0.6201) (0.5031) (0.4827) (0.4878) (0.5175) (0.3684)
Diagonal back 0.5476 -0.3032 -0.0414 -0.1010 0.4746 0.8742***
table neighbor (0.6461) (0.6362) (0.6003) (0.7290) (0.7835) (0.3162)
Diagonal front -0.1448 0.8989 1.0991** 1.4249*** 1.8130*** 1.3955***
aisle neighbor (0.7613) (0.5387) (0.4775) (0.5043) (0.5415) (0.3502)
Diagonal back 0.5170 -0.0329 0.3863 0.5314 0.7473 0.7736**
aisle neighbor (0.5900) (0.4867) (0.4489) (0.5572) (0.6695) (0.2989)
Front neighbor 1.0656** 1.5624*** 1.8238*** 1.9546*** 2.0728*** 0.5420
(0.5139) (0.5587) (0.5555) (0.6648) (0.6521) (0.3666)
Back neighbor -1.9435** -3.1803*** -2.8356*** -3.0540*** -3.7445*** -0.5104
(0.7677) (0.7697) (0.7554) (1.0735) (1.1704) (0.4182)
Constant 90.6076*** 98.4301*** 89.9877*** 90.0403*** 90.0859*** 406.9525***
(0.3800) (0.5392) (1.2814) (1.2227) (1.2791) (97.2890)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 347,539 308,237 308,237 247,473 216,697 216,697
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.0625 0.0895 0.0947 0.1027 0.3987
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.8: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat adjacency
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 1.1348 0.5309 1.1863 0.7385 -2.0352*** -7.0456***
(0.8081) (0.7206) (0.7381) (0.6446) (0.6785) (0.8541)
Aisle neighbor -0.6730 -0.7239 0.1810 0.0262 -3.5678*** -7.6660***
(0.8060) (0.6238) (0.6319) (0.6456) (0.9091) (1.0973)
Diagonal front -0.3275 1.3146 1.5994** 0.5280 0.7061 0.9153
table neighbor (0.7686) (0.8376) (0.7970) (0.8543) (0.9823) (0.9053)
Diagonal back -0.1999 -0.4367 0.5491 0.7586 1.3944 1.7383**
table neighbor (0.9377) (0.9889) (1.0672) (0.9767) (0.9615) (0.7654)
Diagonal front -2.0050** 0.3480 0.8619 1.1570 1.4623 0.1924
aisle neighbor (0.8187) (0.9055) (0.8602) (0.9273) (1.0062) (0.9266)
Diagonal back -0.6153 0.0014 0.9729 2.1209*** 2.8133*** 2.3688***
aisle neighbor (0.9301) (0.7716) (0.7702) (0.6842) (0.6938) (0.7195)
Front neighbor -1.8246** 0.4210 0.7754 0.4441 0.6755 0.3162
(0.6967) (0.6998) (0.6915) (0.6718) (0.7806) (0.6949)
Back neighbor -2.3980*** -0.6017 0.2283 1.9281** 2.5867*** 3.0238***
(0.6720) (0.7989) (0.8067) (0.7555) (0.8162) (0.6214)
Constant 66.3415*** 60.3602*** 55.1803*** 67.2397*** 67.8235*** 942.3308
(1.3179) (4.1267) (4.3631) (5.1583) (5.0087) (950.5786)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 149,451 137,227 137,227 120,677 109,573 109,573
Adjusted R2 0.0002 0.0718 0.1054 0.1947 0.1994 0.2991
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.9: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: vote agreement rates without abstentions
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate without abstentions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.1519 -0.2488 -0.1789 -0.2741** -0.6546*** -0.3090**
(0.1987) (0.1753) (0.1498) (0.1369) (0.1315) (0.1178)
Aisle neighbor 0.0029 0.0751 0.1684 -0.0244 -0.3818*** -0.0334
(0.1807) (0.1630) (0.1374) (0.1366) (0.1412) (0.1283)
Diagonal front -0.3313* -0.6171*** -0.5587*** -0.3000** -0.2859* -0.2668**
table neighbor (0.1771) (0.1935) (0.1660) (0.1450) (0.1685) (0.1250)
Diagonal back -0.2314 -0.4736*** -0.4055*** -0.1875 -0.1627 -0.1777
table neighbor (0.1600) (0.1674) (0.1448) (0.1269) (0.1399) (0.1236)
Diagonal front -0.1923 -0.5229*** -0.4567*** -0.2660* -0.3079* -0.2377*
aisle neighbor (0.1895) (0.1903) (0.1644) (0.1531) (0.1654) (0.1224)
Diagonal back -0.1912 -0.5692*** -0.4998*** -0.3603** -0.3963** -0.2740**
aisle neighbor (0.1804) (0.1820) (0.1572) (0.1534) (0.1630) (0.1273)
Front neighbor -0.4144** -0.5622*** -0.5152*** -0.2429* -0.2139 -0.0661
(0.1710) (0.1761) (0.1523) (0.1408) (0.1819) (0.1324)
Back neighbor -0.4408*** -0.5782*** -0.5350*** -0.3467*** -0.2816* -0.0538
(0.1529) (0.1589) (0.1381) (0.1230) (0.1600) (0.1351)
Constant 89.8617*** 96.6355*** 95.5633*** 97.5271*** 96.4634*** 412.9347***
(0.4173) (0.6224) (1.0556) (0.8310) (0.9496) (124.1088)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 65,006,973 55,486,885 55,486,885 44,973,016 40,022,248 40,022,248
Adjusted R2 0.0000 0.0332 0.0343 0.0445 0.0457 0.1487
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.10: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: vote agreement rates without abstentions
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate without abstentions with Arab league member states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.1321 1.0818*** 1.2493*** 1.4734*** 2.0933*** -0.4362*
(0.4590) (0.3098) (0.3104) (0.2933) (0.2743) (0.2354)
Aisle neighbor 0.8607** 1.6925*** 2.1161*** 2.5671*** 3.3779*** 0.4868**
(0.3702) (0.2072) (0.2234) (0.2541) (0.2915) (0.2320)
Diagonal front 0.9358* 0.8620* 0.8975** 0.9397** 1.2288** 0.2911
table neighbor (0.4781) (0.4471) (0.4239) (0.4679) (0.5441) (0.1823)
Diagonal back 0.7212 -0.3390 -0.0886 0.0905 0.2683 0.7630***
table neighbor (0.5742) (0.6299) (0.6091) (0.7242) (0.7766) (0.2286)
Diagonal front 0.0064 0.6437 0.8104** 0.8515* 1.1491** 0.8656***
aisle neighbor (0.5556) (0.4386) (0.3888) (0.4448) (0.5096) (0.2093)
Diagonal back 0.1334 -0.5674 -0.1936 0.4050 0.5225 0.4657**
aisle neighbor (0.5408) (0.5003) (0.4744) (0.4987) (0.5444) (0.2306)
Front neighbor 1.5512*** 1.2227** 1.4822*** 1.2584** 1.2952** 0.4829**
(0.5158) (0.4610) (0.4751) (0.5794) (0.5880) (0.2008)
Back neighbor -2.4640*** -3.8346*** -3.5474*** -3.5257*** -4.1243*** -0.8685
(0.7682) (0.7880) (0.7720) (1.0360) (1.1497) (0.7608)
Constant 95.7530*** 100.3245*** 94.7190*** 94.9589*** 94.5915*** 120.6226***
(0.2406) (0.2338) (0.7345) (0.6670) (0.7597) (23.1431)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,556,804 1,373,085 1,373,085 1,092,580 960,448 960,448
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0301 0.0493 0.0538 0.0591 0.4948
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
A.2. TABLES 93
Table A.11: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: vote agreement rates without abstentions
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate without abstentions with countries with a colonial past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.4231 -0.3395 0.2791 0.1636 -3.4244*** -4.5353***
(0.9371) (0.8782) (0.9182) (0.7623) (0.9610) (0.8661)
Aisle neighbor -1.7272* -1.9669** -1.0514 -1.0792 -5.4594*** -4.8394***
(0.9723) (0.7891) (0.8132) (0.7907) (1.3713) (1.1062)
Diagonal front -0.7840 1.8209 1.9395* 0.4762 1.0507 1.2306
table neighbor (0.9647) (1.1197) (1.0670) (1.0650) (1.2507) (1.0920)
Diagonal back -0.2755 -0.4833 0.2339 0.5184 1.5391 1.7377
table neighbor (1.2081) (1.3426) (1.4762) (1.2570) (1.2545) (1.0458)
Diagonal front -3.2673*** -0.1112 0.4410 0.5418 1.0302 0.0122
aisle neighbor (1.1396) (1.2793) (1.2069) (1.2031) (1.3157) (1.1531)
Diagonal back -1.2264 -0.4383 0.3052 1.8848** 2.8248*** 2.6250***
aisle neighbor (1.2302) (1.1056) (1.1006) (0.8926) (0.8998) (0.7725)
Front neighbor -2.9239*** -0.2697 0.2641 -0.0965 0.4554 0.7976
(0.9503) (0.9856) (0.9276) (0.8610) (1.0730) (0.9141)
Back neighbor -3.1748*** -1.5508 -0.7701 1.8924** 2.5743** 3.8502***
(0.9758) (1.1205) (1.0729) (0.9435) (0.9790) (0.6903)
Constant 74.8241*** 65.7094*** 60.8049*** 75.1781*** 73.9264*** 1,389.572
(1.5071) (6.0729) (6.3322) (7.0835) (7.0859) (1,340.065)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 459,849 413,558 413,558 368,872 338,807 338,807
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0786 0.1217 0.2763 0.2840 0.3880
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.12: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.3042 -0.1570 -0.2513 -0.7421*** -0.3256**
(0.2177) (0.1824) (0.1685) (0.1699) (0.1259)
Aisle neighbor -0.1022 0.0841 -0.0639 -0.5127*** -0.0232
(0.1981) (0.1642) (0.1634) (0.1704) (0.1502)
Diagonal front -0.8433*** -0.6974*** -0.4666*** -0.4466** -0.2698**
table neighbor (0.2053) (0.1692) (0.1438) (0.1767) (0.1341)
Diagonal back -0.6893*** -0.5364*** -0.3339** -0.3116** -0.1555
table neighbor (0.1819) (0.1533) (0.1340) (0.1526) (0.1366)
Diagonal front -0.6916*** -0.5159*** -0.3679** -0.4264** -0.2294*
aisle neighbor (0.2179) (0.1839) (0.1846) (0.1930) (0.1314)
Diagonal back -0.7418*** -0.5632*** -0.4545** -0.5050*** -0.2472*
aisle neighbor (0.1993) (0.1647) (0.1742) (0.1799) (0.1339)
Front neighbor -0.6805*** -0.5422*** -0.1989 -0.1845 -0.0234
(0.1886) (0.1558) (0.1552) (0.1901) (0.1369)
Back neighbor -0.7072*** -0.5744*** -0.3572*** -0.2974* -0.0125
(0.1604) (0.1317) (0.1199) (0.1582) (0.1299)
Constant 88.3790*** 86.1550*** 87.9080*** 86.5750*** 557.0561***
(0.9253) (1.3477) (1.1346) (1.2662) (113.5287)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 68,079,315 68,079,315 55,040,433 48,947,754 48,947,754
Adjusted R2 0.0346 0.0367 0.0471 0.0481 0.1435
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism
indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.13: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and
Krieger (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.5170 0.8951* 1.1918*** 1.9219*** -0.2142
(0.4997) (0.4744) (0.4213) (0.3977) (0.2599)
Aisle neighbor 0.8870** 1.4832*** 2.1862*** 3.3157*** 0.6953***
(0.3949) (0.3776) (0.3634) (0.3535) (0.2227)
Diagonal front 1.1174** 1.1501** 1.3292** 1.5129** 0.0910
table neighbor (0.4917) (0.4714) (0.5088) (0.5874) (0.3716)
Diagonal back -0.3804 -0.1745 -0.2604 0.2910 0.8963***
table neighbor (0.6677) (0.6423) (0.7494) (0.8021) (0.3111)
Diagonal front 0.8100 1.0054* 1.3162** 1.6259*** 1.2524***
aisle neighbor (0.5630) (0.5078) (0.5335) (0.5851) (0.3222)
Diagonal back -0.1974 0.1057 0.2879 0.4296 0.7466**
aisle neighbor (0.5134) (0.4870) (0.5768) (0.6615) (0.2817)
Front neighbor 1.3740*** 1.5961*** 1.8156*** 1.9503*** 0.5500
(0.4877) (0.4864) (0.6074) (0.6072) (0.3573)
Back neighbor -3.0272*** -2.7466*** -2.9485*** -3.8846*** -0.8648
(0.7342) (0.7212) (1.0426) (1.1496) (0.8882)
Constant 96.4823*** 89.0173*** 88.4525*** 88.0109*** 359.8442***
(0.4417) (1.0743) (1.0554) (1.0824) (87.6239)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,548,893 1,548,893 1,230,606 1,080,1480.0761 1,080,148
Adjusted R2 0.0511 0.0714 0.0734 0.0761 0.3954
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism
indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.14: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger
(2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.0878 0.8614 1.0433* -2.1920*** -2.8966***
(0.7001) (0.7077) (0.5969) (0.6390) (0.6035)
Aisle neighbor -1.1907* -0.2354 0.0567 -4.0092*** -3.2353***
(0.6198) (0.6139) (0.6219) (0.9477) (0.8047)
Diagonal front 0.7759 1.0522 0.1497 0.3401 0.4631
table neighbor (0.7795) (0.7118) (0.7963) (0.9152) (0.7845)
Diagonal back -1.1384 -0.2710 0.0188 0.7129 1.0041
table neighbor (0.9345) (1.0051) (0.9362) (0.9291) (0.6859)
Diagonal front -0.2616 0.3617 0.7040 1.0323 0.1508
aisle neighbor (0.8863) (0.8189) (0.8679) (0.9429) (0.7972)
Diagonal back -0.6964 0.2824 1.3816** 2.1714*** 1.7087***
aisle neighbor (0.7497) (0.7426) (0.6586) (0.6639) (0.5447)
Front neighbor -0.2173 0.4964 0.4092 0.6144 0.4060
(0.6781) (0.6403) (0.6453) (0.7645) (0.5682)
Back neighbor -0.9795 -0.3571 1.1484* 1.8412** 2.4090***
(0.7642) (0.7238) (0.6812) (0.7514) (0.4491)
Constant 63.8222*** 57.9890*** 67.3178*** 66.9366*** 1,077.128
(4.3711) (4.5011) (4.9781) (5.0436) (942.2663)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 616,201 616,201 545,879 500,936 500,936
Adjusted R2 0.0689 0.1054 0.2065 0.2110 0.3063
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism
indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.15: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.1673 -0.0069 -0.2340 -0.3398* 0.2331*
(0.2270) (0.1987) (0.1941) (0.1876) (0.131)
Aisle neighbor -0.1511 0.0234 -0.2605 -0.4239** 0.2060
(0.1922) (0.1772) (0.1869) (0.1899) (0.1511)
Diagonal front -0.9372*** -0.7909*** -0.3936** -0.4009** -0.3140*
table neighbor (0.2299) (0.1997) (0.1669) (0.1950) (0.1628)
Diagonal back -0.7522*** -0.6164*** -0.2119 -0.2293 -0.2135
table neighbor (0.1964) (0.1754) (0.1508) (0.1657) (0.1653)
Diagonal front -0.6435*** -0.4868*** -0.3419* -0.4269** -0.2342
aisle neighbor (0.2101) (0.1815) (0.1980) (0.2124) (0.1585)
Diagonal back -0.6396*** -0.4886** -0.3925* -0.4441* -0.2369
aisle neighbor (0.2132) (0.1947) (0.2061) (0.2266) (0.1780)
Front neighbor -1.3096*** -1.1741*** -0.6856*** -0.6196*** -0.2399
(0.1978) (0.1704) (0.1625) (0.1972) (0.1584)
Back neighbor -1.3729*** -1.2529*** -0.8861*** -0.7756*** -0.2559
(0.1736) (0.1509) (0.1417) (0.1792) (0.1569)
Constant 87.7238*** 85.1968*** 86.7967*** 85.6277*** 609.1286***
(0.6953) (1.2603) (1.0562) (1.1853) (113.7983)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 59,014,475 59,014,475 47,394,778 42,108,331 42,108,331
Adjusted R2 0.0422 0.0444 0.0541 0.0551 0.1472
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.16: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al.
(2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.7306 0.7952 1.2488*** 2.2606*** -0.2817
(0.5231) (0.4865) (0.4426) (0.4430) (0.2607)
Aisle neighbor 1.2543*** 1.6080*** 2.5647*** 3.9834*** 0.6568***
(0.3977) (0.4097) (0.3540) (0.3604) (0.2325)
Diagonal front 1.7005*** 1.7101*** 1.5432*** 1.7945*** 0.2951
table neighbor (0.5615) (0.5310) (0.5132) (0.5867) (0.3335)
Diagonal back 0.0756 0.3231 0.3105 0.9228 1.0846***
table neighbor (0.6633) (0.6642) (0.7532) (0.8199) (0.3451)
Diagonal front 0.9288 1.0780** 1.4223** 1.6911*** 1.2726***
aisle neighbor (0.5575) (0.5214) (0.5450) (0.5422) (0.3292)
Diagonal back 0.2471 0.5129 0.6352 0.8662 0.9095***
aisle neighbor (0.6280) (0.6154) (0.6894) (0.8002) (0.3151)
Front neighbor 1.1348** 1.1053** 0.8691 1.0118 0.5069
(0.5080) (0.4934) (0.6525) (0.6405) (0.3716)
Back neighbor -3.0741*** -2.8099*** -2.8798*** -3.6466*** -1.1608
(0.7654) (0.7535) (1.0620) (1.1589) (1.0478)
Constant 97.8156*** 89.4180*** 89.5528*** 88.6371*** 403.5025***
(0.4225) (1.2002) (1.1216) (1.1407) (94.1490)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,439,700 1,439,700 1,131,492 994,039 994,039
Adjusted R2 0.0594 0.0752 0.0782 0.0819 0.4041
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.17: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.5291 1.3349* 1.5467** -0.9623 -3.4693***
(0.7130) (0.7101) (0.6032) (0.6362) (0.6831)
Aisle neighbor -0.3832 0.5027 1.0252 -2.6941*** -3.8856***
(0.6753) (0.6859) (0.6259) (0.9694) (0.8770)
Diagonal front 0.7093 1.0736 -0.0070 -0.0268 0.2180
table neighbor (1.0049) (0.9392) (0.9110) (1.1326) (0.8910)
Diagonal back 0.0187 0.8812 1.4073 2.1351** 1.3989*
table neighbor (1.0767) (1.1073) (1.0118) (0.9882) (0.7193)
Diagonal front -0.5872 -0.1535 1.2803 1.8999* 0.4018
aisle neighbor (0.9089) (0.8859) (0.9591) (1.0724) (0.9571)
Diagonal back -0.4378 0.5865 2.3230*** 2.8571*** 1.9860***
aisle neighbor (0.9734) (0.9004) (0.7913) (0.8031) (0.6508)
Front neighbor 0.1315 0.9808 0.6294 1.0489 0.1336
(0.7437) (0.6969) (0.6815) (0.8138) (0.6265)
Back neighbor -2.1665*** -1.3773* 0.3613 0.9462 2.4689***
(0.8069) (0.7892) (0.7025) (0.7390) (0.4930)
Constant 65.1913*** 57.6348*** 70.4186*** 70.2231*** 1051.2930
(2.0491) (2.6464) (3.0674) (3.3366) (998.8562)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 541,342 541,342 482,986 446,373 446,373
Adjusted R2 0.0680 0.1046 0.2220 0.2252 0.3137
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.18: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.3201 -0.1852 -0.3522* -0.5302** 0.0147
(0.2383) (0.2151) (0.2116) (0.2023) (0.1421)
Aisle neighbor -0.4169** -0.2676 -0.4861** -0.7393*** 0.0860
(0.2086) (0.1983) (0.2177) (0.2272) (0.1618)
Diagonal front -0.9765*** -0.8554*** -0.4135** -0.4530** -0.3665**
table neighbor (0.2254) (0.2010) (0.1643) (0.2013) (0.1719)
Diagonal back -0.7897*** -0.6769*** -0.2198 -0.2660 -0.2872
table neighbor (0.1995) (0.1845) (0.1596) (0.1744) (0.1730)
Diagonal front -0.7762*** -0.6348*** -0.4469** -0.5573** -0.3388**
aisle neighbor (0.2205) (0.1988) (0.2061) (0.2210) (0.1670)
Diagonal back -0.7472*** -0.6197*** -0.5072** -0.5973** -0.3456*
aisle neighbor (0.2160) (0.2037) (0.2071) (0.2259) (0.1819)
Front neighbor -1.3476*** -1.2310*** -0.6905*** -0.6293*** -0.2901*
(0.1950) (0.1721) (0.1669) (0.2021) (0.1648)
Back neighbor -1.4435*** -1.3450*** -0.9153*** -0.8221*** -0.3156*
(0.1655) (0.1502) (0.1435) (0.1749) (0.1605)
Constant 82.8737*** 80.3092*** 82.1328*** 80.8514*** 616.9247***
(0.5367) (1.2405) (1.0185) (1.1513) (114.5713)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 56,232,515 56,232,515 45,395,340 40,305,583 40,305,583
Adjusted R2 0.0319 0.0339 0.0455 0.0464 0.1427
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.19: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al.
(2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.0379 0.0515 0.6554 1.7490*** -0.3408
(0.5913) (0.5382) (0.5107) (0.4779) (0.2749)
Aisle neighbor 0.7448* 1.0649** 1.9133*** 3.4249*** 0.6293**
(0.3917) (0.4101) (0.4002) (0.3951) (0.2465)
Diagonal front 1.9018*** 1.8543*** 1.8496*** 2.0061*** 0.2301
table neighbor (0.6173) (0.5907) (0.5576) (0.6613) (0.3528)
Diagonal back 0.0808 0.2969 0.3127 0.7707 1.2228***
table neighbor (0.7417) (0.7365) (0.7791) (0.8420) (0.3344)
Diagonal front 1.1031* 1.3171** 1.3581** 1.4986** 1.3106***
aisle neighbor (0.5822) (0.5443) (0.5680) (0.5696) (0.3396)
Diagonal back -0.2200 -0.0352 0.1081 0.1186 1.0764***
aisle neighbor (0.7098) (0.7051) (0.7199) (0.8494) (0.3768)
Front neighbor 0.8236 0.7817 0.5915 0.6455 0.5584
(0.5522) (0.5455) (0.7002) (0.6829) (0.3911)
Back neighbor -3.1480*** -2.8884*** -2.7365** -3.7160*** -1.2340
(0.8270) (0.8097) (1.1056) (1.1977) (1.0363)
Constant 95.3055*** 85.7494*** 87.4014*** 86.4530*** 409.1110***
(0.4426) (1.2841) (1.2101) (1.2737) (96.5490)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,338,066 1,338,066 1,072,037 944,277 944,277
Adjusted R2 0.0432 0.0592 0.0612 0.0650 0.4070
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.20: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.6049 1.4476* 1.8205*** -1.2168* -3.7969***
(0.7587) (0.7571) (0.6329) (0.6998) (0.6976)
Aisle neighbor 0.0840 1.0851 1.2829* -2.9962*** -4.2119***
(0.7669) (0.7593) (0.6547) (1.0253) (0.8767)
Diagonal front 0.6783 1.1411 -0.1477 -0.3203 0.1863
table neighbor (1.0647) (0.9902) (0.9475) (1.1702) (0.8929)
Diagonal back 0.3504 1.1700 1.7339* 2.4721** 1.7165**
table neighbor (1.0788) (1.1134) (0.9928) (0.9753) (0.6931)
Diagonal front -0.9379 -0.5078 0.9157 1.3544 0.2310
aisle neighbor (0.9547) (0.9321) (0.9914) (1.1110) (0.9985)
Diagonal back -0.5178 0.4187 2.1898*** 2.7206*** 1.8981***
aisle neighbor (1.0377) (1.0039) (0.8155) (0.8318) (0.6518)
Front neighbor 0.1290 1.0128 0.5524 0.7365 -0.0748
(0.7765) (0.7363) (0.6952) (0.8405) (0.6336)
Back neighbor -2.6655*** -1.9686** 0.0160 0.7261 2.3018***
(0.8760) (0.8603) (0.7767) (0.7627) (0.5197)
Constant 69.7617*** 58.7913*** 75.0148*** 74.6448*** 1,090.684
(1.0034) (2.2987) (2.3303) (2.8338) (1,012.835)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 518,854 518,854 464,263 429,378 429,378
Adjusted R2 0.0720 0.1099 0.2279 0.2307 0.3182
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.21: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.1812 -0.0869 -0.1139 -0.6135*** -0.1929*
(0.2094) (0.1790) (0.1563) (0.1625) (0.1138)
Aisle neighbor -0.1191 -0.0139 -0.0957 -0.5458*** -0.0388
(0.1994) (0.1760) (0.1675) (0.1691) (0.1467)
Diagonal front -0.7222*** -0.6281*** -0.3835*** -0.3647** -0.2622**
table neighbor (0.1999) (0.1722) (0.1337) (0.1651) (0.1183)
Diagonal back -0.5713*** -0.4746*** -0.3152** -0.2774* -0.1879
table neighbor (0.1809) (0.1577) (0.1418) (0.1540) (0.1397)
Diagonal front -0.4962** -0.3973** -0.3319* -0.3836* -0.2119
aisle neighbor (0.2139) (0.1867) (0.1828) (0.1956) (0.1341)
Diagonal back -0.5129** -0.4211** -0.3959** -0.4264** -0.2125
aisle neighbor (0.1986) (0.1696) (0.1709) (0.1799) (0.1358)
Front neighbor -0.5955*** -0.5069*** -0.2452* -0.2361 -0.1076
(0.1721) (0.1416) (0.1454) (0.1821) (0.1307)
Back neighbor -0.6218*** -0.5401*** -0.3443*** -0.3178** -0.1051
(0.1449) (0.1179) (0.1096) (0.1513) (0.1257)
Constant 88.2292*** 86.7794*** 88.0414*** 86.6853*** 600.0361***
(0.7834) (1.2518) (1.0940) (1.2296) (113.5536)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 75,570,438 75,570,438 57,593,961 51,271,914 51,271,914
Adjusted R2 0.0352 0.0366 0.0488 0.0496 0.1428
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.22: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.5047 0.7734 1.6294*** 2.2627*** -0.2769
(0.5377) (0.5354) (0.4231) (0.4011) (0.2652)
Aisle neighbor 1.6680*** 1.9829*** 2.5350*** 3.5770*** 0.6950***
(0.4560) (0.4550) (0.3707) (0.3443) (0.2180)
Diagonal front 1.0201* 1.0164* 1.4028** 1.5400** 0.1234
table neighbor (0.5561) (0.5283) (0.5767) (0.6560) (0.3729)
Diagonal back 0.4733 0.4706 -0.0670 0.3193 0.9274***
table neighbor (0.6217) (0.6096) (0.7294) (0.7776) (0.3026)
Diagonal front 0.0564 0.2540 1.5022*** 1.8528*** 1.2830***
aisle neighbor (0.6443) (0.5930) (0.5260) (0.5545) (0.3301)
Diagonal back 0.3776 0.3346 0.1437 0.1513 0.6675**
aisle neighbor (0.5109) (0.4949) (0.6098) (0.6929) (0.2923)
Front neighbor 1.8386*** 1.9160*** 1.4574** 1.5930*** 0.4510
(0.4715) (0.4743) (0.5751) (0.5744) (0.3471)
Back neighbor -2.1634*** -2.0631*** -2.8914*** -3.8355*** -1.2052
(0.6848) (0.6839) (1.0428) (1.1437) (1.0442)
Constant 96.5806*** 92.3543*** 89.3534*** 88.8010*** 422.1475***
(0.3620) (1.0432) (1.0352) (1.0698) (95.9963)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,659,197 1,659,197 1,269,381 1,115,245 1,115,245
Adjusted R2 0.0660 0.0785 0.0790 0.0819 0.3910
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.23: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.7627 1.3986* 1.5112** -1.5354** -2.8191***
(0.7143) (0.7169) (0.6129) (0.6583) (0.5987)
Aisle neighbor -0.6316 0.1973 0.5239 -3.4826*** -3.2849***
(0.6493) (0.6453) (0.6298) (0.9138) (0.7814)
Diagonal front 0.3778 0.9154 -0.0464 0.1250 0.3786
table neighbor (0.7231) (0.6783) (0.8009) (0.9263) (0.7825)
Diagonal back -0.5931 0.0178 0.2299 0.8243 1.0205
table neighbor (0.8915) (0.9387) (0.8833) (0.8844) (0.6551)
Diagonal front -0.5673 0.1303 0.3547 0.6613 0.0326
aisle neighbor (0.8342) (0.7820) (0.8462) (0.9218) (0.7906)
Diagonal back -0.3120 0.5525 1.4524** 2.1625*** 1.8337***
aisle neighbor (0.8052) (0.7704) (0.6901) (0.7028) (0.5556)
Front neighbor -0.6653 0.1800 0.4535 0.6842 0.2404
(0.6311) (0.6170) (0.6375) (0.7523) (0.5579)
Back neighbor -1.1623 -0.4109 1.1679* 1.7253** 2.5433***
(0.7415) (0.7177) (0.6482) (0.7150) (0.4560)
Constant 61.0126*** 55.4842*** 64.5062*** 64.1264*** 1,166.646
(3.4605) (3.7313) (4.5473) (4.6192) (984.1038)
Political variables?a. X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 646,560 646,560 562,132 515,952 515,952
Adjusted R2 0.0626 0.0992 0.2109 0.2151 0.3097
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator
of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.24: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.3266 -0.5991*** -0.3478**
(0.1979) (0.2141) (0.1423)
Aisle neighbor -0.1615 -0.3810* -0.1072
(0.1867) (0.1989) (0.1388)
Diagonal front -0.6116*** -0.6816*** -0.3660**
table neighbor (0.1821) (0.1966) (0.1513)
Diagonal back -0.4261*** -0.4439** -0.2429*
table neighbor (0.1572) (0.1766) (0.1425)
Diagonal front -0.4415** -0.6143*** -0.2786*
aisle neighbor (0.1924) (0.1992) (0.1519)
Diagonal back -0.4945** -0.6239*** -0.2405
aisle neighbor (0.1919) (0.1976) (0.1544)
Front neighbor -0.7402*** -0.8431*** -0.2856**
(0.1753) (0.2053) (0.1377)
Back neighbor -0.9005*** -0.9507*** -0.2613*
(0.1615) (0.1916) (0.1415)
Constant 84.3679*** 82.5131*** 457.5458***
(4.2565) (4.3918) (134.5776)
Political variables?a. X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X
Delegation variables?c. X X X
Macro variables?d. X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 54,104,602 48,406,456 48,406,456
Adjusted R2 0.0579 0.0591 0.1459
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and a communism indicator of a country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include the number of days since a delegation first voted on a contested
resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, and indicators whether a country’s
executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN is
female, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the
the differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables available upon request.
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Table A.25: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden
(2014)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 1.3182*** 1.8767*** -0.2721
(0.4299) (0.4407) (0.2958)
Aisle neighbor 2.1993*** 3.3913*** 0.6197**
(0.4771) (0.4631) (0.2813)
Diagonal front 1.0453** 1.2305** 0.0003
table neighbor (0.5078) (0.5640) (0.3412)
Diagonal back -0.7865 -0.3129 0.7664**
table neighbor (0.7890) (0.8674) (0.3221)
Diagonal front 1.0380* 1.3816** 0.8952***
aisle neighbor (0.5284) (0.5574) (0.2728)
Diagonal back -0.5138 -0.5443 0.5096
aisle neighbor (0.5800) (0.6715) (0.3060)
Front neighbor 2.5652*** 2.7775*** 0.7136**
(0.6318) (0.6308) (0.3126)
Back neighbor -3.9397*** -4.7662*** -0.9083
(0.7948) (0.8886) (0.7912)
Constant 91.5102*** 90.7691*** 388.6570***
(3.0236) (2.9122) (91.8702)
Political variables?a. X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X
Delegation variables?c. X X X
Macro variables?d. X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,253,950 1,107,925 1,107,925
Adjusted R2 0.0901 0.0917 0.3998
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and a communism indicator of a country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include the number of days since a delegation first voted on a contested
resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, and indicators whether a country’s
executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN is
female, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the
the differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables available upon request.
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Table A.26: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 1.4439** -1.6199** -2.9349***
(0.6983) (0.7383) (0.6139)
Aisle neighbor 0.5165 -3.4648*** -3.8291***
(0.5869) (0.8727) (0.7947)
Diagonal front 0.3455 0.4230 0.4851
table neighbor (0.8021) (0.8729) (0.7074)
Diagonal back 0.7873 1.4021 1.1372
table neighbor (1.0266) (1.0104) (0.7927)
Diagonal front 0.2299 0.2531 -0.3490
aisle neighbor (0.8418) (0.9030) (0.7898)
Diagonal back 1.0383 1.6853** 1.2354*
aisle neighbor (0.8240) (0.8385) (0.7088)
Front neighbor 0.1204 0.1159 0.5952
(0.7037) (0.7943) (0.5766)
Back neighbor 0.0105 0.5510 1.4954***
(0.6596) (0.7303) (0.4586)
Constant 89.1230 89.8516 631.6486
(57.7806) (57.1760) (845.9246)
Political variables?a. X X X
Resolution variables?b. X X X
Delegation variables?c. X X X
Macro variables?d. X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 553,148 508,250 508,250
Adjusted R2 0.2098 0.2136 0.3054
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the
the differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.27: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: same language
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.1572 -0.2285 -0.0654 -0.1729 -0.5059*** -0.2191*
(0.2293) (0.2114) (0.1733) (0.1610) (0.1612) (0.1225)
Aisle neighbor -0.1449 0.0020 0.2071 0.0588 -0.2262 0.1220
(0.2050) (0.1913) (0.1542) (0.1532) (0.1601) (0.1385)
Diagonal front -0.5510*** -0.8556*** -0.6953*** -0.4228*** -0.3620** -0.2614**
table neighbor (0.1905) (0.2055) (0.1673) (0.1428) (0.1727) (0.1274)
Diagonal back -0.4373** -0.7183*** -0.5514*** -0.3252** -0.2546* -0.1518
table neighbor (0.1727) (0.1782) (0.1464) (0.1228) (0.1405) (0.1275)
Diagonal front -0.3595* -0.6989*** -0.5043*** -0.3322* -0.3412* -0.2099
aisle neighbor (0.2091) (0.2142) (0.1774) (0.1753) (0.1813) (0.1266)
Diagonal back -0.3495* -0.7540*** -0.5561*** -0.4479*** -0.4408** -0.2358*
aisle neighbor (0.1953) (0.1974) (0.1607) (0.1655) (0.1675) (0.1294)
Front neighbor -0.6346*** -0.7069*** -0.5591*** -0.1800 -0.1313 -0.0027
(0.1798) (0.1927) (0.1595) (0.1651) (0.2024) (0.1413)
Back neighbor -0.6691*** -0.7423*** -0.5999*** -0.3430*** -0.2399 0.0035
(0.1535) (0.1643) (0.1347) (0.1244) (0.1669) (0.1330)
Constant 81.8707*** 89.7090*** 87.2184*** 89.1242*** 87.9074*** 557.5048***
(0.4115) (0.9526) (1.3504) (1.1454) (1.2661) (113.6427)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Same language indicator? X X X X X X
Observations 79,742,480 68,079,315 68,079,315 55,040,433 48,947,754 48,947,754
Adjusted R2 0.0017 0.0421 0.0446 0.0537 0.0543 0.1462
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.28: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: same language
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.2779 0.9147* 1.3004*** 1.6332*** 2.3640*** -0.1645
(0.5131) (0.4578) (0.4193) (0.3940) (0.3618) (0.2605)
Aisle neighbor 0.3471 1.2958*** 1.9279*** 2.6999*** 3.8863*** 0.7561***
(0.4350) (0.3973) (0.3785) (0.3960) (0.3746) (0.2230)
Diagonal front 1.0710* 0.8877* 0.9029* 1.0619** 1.2916** 0.0785
table neighbor (0.5929) (0.4902) (0.4711) (0.4965) (0.5548) (0.3726)
Diagonal back 0.7189 -0.4729 -0.2668 -0.3913 0.1073 0.8654***
table neighbor (0.6526) (0.6503) (0.6242) (0.7255) (0.7841) (0.3123)
Diagonal front 0.1259 0.7295 0.9149* 1.1803** 1.5366*** 1.2473***
aisle neighbor (0.7438) (0.5427) (0.4872) (0.5028) (0.5456) (0.3192)
Diagonal back 0.6964 -0.2117 0.1118 0.1935 0.3298 0.7169**
aisle neighbor (0.5842) (0.4883) (0.4565) (0.5456) (0.6287) (0.2840)
Front neighbor 1.1805** 1.3630** 1.5707*** 1.8562*** 2.0249*** 0.5218
(0.4856) (0.5193) (0.5274) (0.6337) (0.6326) (0.3569)
Back neighbor -1.7188** -3.3355*** -3.0821*** -3.5062*** -4.3294*** -1.1175
(0.7329) (0.7295) (0.7178) (1.0213) (1.1358) (0.9863)
Constant 89.8308*** 98.3002*** 90.9073*** 90.6459*** 90.3902*** 360.7404***
(0.4107) (0.5887) (1.2039) (1.1627) (1.1760) (87.4851)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Same language indicator? X X X X X X
Observations 1,764,621 1,548,893 1,548,893 1,230,606 1,080,148 1,080,148
Adjusted R2 0.0016 0.0627 0.0844 0.0877 0.0904 0.3956
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.29: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: same language
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.9071 0.4994 1.1783 1.1107* -2.3672*** -2.8568***
(0.8082) (0.7382) (0.7377) (0.6137) (0.6656) (0.5973)
Aisle neighbor -0.7805 -0.5949 0.2160 0.2486 -4.0927*** -3.1761***
(0.8071) (0.6391) (0.6339) (0.6363) (0.9321) (0.7884)
Diagonal front -0.8588 0.8780 1.0805 0.2059 0.1801 0.4406
table neighbor (0.7042) (0.7933) (0.7303) (0.8021) (0.9378) (0.7832)
Diagonal back -0.7539 -1.1226 -0.3907 -0.0444 0.6480 1.1181
table neighbor (0.8522) (0.9262) (0.9939) (0.9202) (0.9184) (0.6876)
Diagonal front -2.5249*** -0.0391 0.4972 0.9002 0.9877 0.1149
aisle neighbor (0.8054) (0.9135) (0.8569) (0.8929) (0.9585) (0.7911)
Diagonal back -1.1749 -0.5920 0.2479 1.4124** 2.1936*** 1.7912***
aisle neighbor (0.9117) (0.7617) (0.7497) (0.6702) (0.6787) (0.5412)
Front neighbor -2.3695*** 0.0049 0.6622 0.5349 0.4890 0.3398
(0.6690) (0.6718) (0.6210) (0.6322) (0.7562) (0.5647)
Back neighbor -2.9666*** -1.0058 -0.4693 0.9992 1.7106** 2.4090***
(0.6224) (0.7621) (0.7270) (0.6712) (0.7363) (0.4623)
Constant 67.6748*** 61.5119*** 56.5762*** 67.3823*** 66.9131*** 1,077.035
(1.3405) (4.1474) (4.3675) (4.9966) (5.0530) (942.4203)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Same language indicator? X X X X X X
Observations 678,266 616,201 616,201 545,879 500,936 500,936
Adjusted R2 0.0016 0.0740 0.1083 0.2087 0.2133 0.3068
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.30: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: same colonizer
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.0636 -0.1188 0.0805 -0.0059 -0.2737* -0.1851
(0.2136) (0.1985) (0.1598) (0.1468) (0.1460) (0.1217)
Aisle neighbor -0.0216 0.1344 0.3844** 0.2275 0.0139 0.1607
(0.1898) (0.1777) (0.1467) (0.1469) (0.1539) (0.1373)
Diagonal front -0.6210*** -0.8969*** -0.7013*** -0.4246*** -0.4226** -0.3122**
table neighbor (0.1796) (0.1949) (0.1618) (0.1421) (0.1673) (0.1289)
Diagonal back -0.4673*** -0.7233*** -0.5194*** -0.3523*** -0.2832** -0.1871
table neighbor (0.1642) (0.1673) (0.1417) (0.1221) (0.1315) (0.1276)
Diagonal front -0.4425** -0.7413*** -0.5037*** -0.3427* -0.3674** -0.2550*
aisle neighbor (0.1980) (0.2015) (0.1739) (0.1756) (0.1801) (0.1293)
Diagonal back -0.3964** -0.7741*** -0.5315*** -0.4771*** -0.4207** -0.2729**
aisle neighbor (0.1844) (0.1864) (0.1603) (0.1695) (0.1729) (0.1310)
Front neighbor -0.6334*** -0.6649*** -0.4725*** -0.0994 -0.0665 -0.0156
(0.1708) (0.1804) (0.1504) (0.1511) (0.1870) (0.1374)
Back neighbor -0.6722*** -0.7265*** -0.5428*** -0.2715** -0.1483 -0.0197
(0.1468) (0.1531) (0.1260) (0.1166) (0.1495) (0.1314)
Constant 81.8513*** 88.7195*** 85.6735*** 87.5352*** 86.4896*** 557.5145***
(0.3747) (0.9037) (1.2204) (1.0184) (1.1262) (113.6445)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Same colonizer indicator? X X X X X X
Observations 79,742,480 68,079,315 68,079,315 55,040,433 48,947,754 48,947,754
Adjusted R2 0.0161 0.0517 0.0552 0.0645 0.0656 0.1466
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
A.2. TABLES 113
Table A.31: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: same colonizer
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.2832 1.0267** 1.4809*** 1.9357*** 2.9001*** -0.1686
(0.5189) (0.4641) (0.4148) (0.3980) (0.3750) (0.2604)
Aisle neighbor 0.1675 1.2545*** 1.9599*** 2.8032*** 4.2609*** 0.7504***
(0.4608) (0.4169) (0.3957) (0.4083) (0.3885) (0.2225)
Diagonal front 0.8563 0.6963 0.7479 0.8983 1.1284* 0.0721
table neighbor (0.6376) (0.5341) (0.5152) (0.5389) (0.6053) (0.3729)
Diagonal back 0.7152 -0.5429 -0.2795 -0.4368 -0.0575 0.8628***
table neighbor (0.6388) (0.6365) (0.6137) (0.6929) (0.7389) (0.3125)
Diagonal front -0.0821 0.5642 0.7749 0.9868* 1.2934** 1.2361***
aisle neighbor (0.7500) (0.5500) (0.4948) (0.5201) (0.5558) (0.3194)
Diagonal back 0.7462 -0.2618 0.1144 0.2005 0.2288 0.7145**
aisle neighbor (0.5668) (0.4697) (0.4353) (0.5354) (0.6112) (0.2843)
Front neighbor 0.9004 1.0158* 1.3123** 1.3447** 1.4918** 0.5287
(0.5439) (0.5308) (0.5412) (0.6553) (0.6565) (0.3570)
Back neighbor -1.4726* -3.1644*** -2.8626*** -3.2399*** -4.1171*** -1.0922
(0.7454) (0.7354) (0.7246) (0.9945) (1.0965) (0.938)
Constant 89.5553*** 97.4276*** 89.3824*** 88.5042*** 88.3952*** 360.7356***
(0.3738) (0.4854) (1.1127) (1.0938) (1.0588) (87.4854)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Same colonizer indicator? X X X X X X
Observations 1,764,621 1,548,893 1,548,893 1,230,606 1,080,148 1,080,148
Adjusted R2 0.0082 0.0680 0.0931 0.0961 0.0985 0.3956
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
A.2. TABLES 114
Table A.32: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: country pair-fixed effects
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -2.0645*** -2.3670*** -1.5352*** -0.6250* -0.9986*** 0.0710
(0.6622) (0.5989) (0.4038) (0.3237) (0.3458) (0.267)
Aisle neighbor -2.1267*** -2.3809*** -1.5275*** -0.6512** -0.9987*** 0.0446
(0.6639) (0.5997) (0.4089) (0.3176) (0.3518) (0.2671)
Diagonal front -0.8690*** -0.9423*** -0.6606*** -0.5532*** -0.5264*** -0.1686
table neighbor (0.2107) (0.2080) (0.1443) (0.1303) (0.1343) (0.1126)
Diagonal back -0.8158*** -0.8751*** -0.5965*** -0.4338*** -0.4265*** -0.1053
table neighbor (0.1955) (0.1944) (0.1337) (0.1317) (0.1287) (0.1225)
Diagonal front -0.6356*** -0.7460*** -0.4341*** -0.3274** -0.3307** -0.0181
aisle neighbor (0.2262) (0.2145) (0.1617) (0.1554) (0.1568) (0.1114)
Diagonal back -0.5839** -0.7031*** -0.3935** -0.2954* -0.3152* -0.0276
aisle neighbor (0.2234) (0.2126) (0.1600) (0.1589) (0.1591) (0.1128)
Front neighbor -0.9098*** -0.9848*** -0.6885*** -0.3990*** -0.3709*** -0.0811
(0.2490) (0.2308) (0.1618) (0.1251) (0.1236) (0.1121)
Back neighbor -0.8682*** -0.9350*** -0.6442*** -0.4074*** -0.3920*** -0.0740
(0.2433) (0.2204) (0.1532) (0.1196) (0.1208) (0.1068)
Constant 82.5395*** 83.2642*** 81.2785*** 82.9648*** 82.4316*** -5135706***
(0.2929) (0.6722) (0.9354) (0.7991) (0.8504) (0.5022)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Country pair- X X X X X X
fixed effects?
Observations 79,742,478 68,079,314 68,079,314 55,040,432 48,947,754 48,947,754
Adjusted R2 0.1588 0.1753 0.1768 0.1828 0.1866 0.1947
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.33: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: country pair-fixed effects
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -4.8984*** -5.6286*** -2.6430*** 0.1533 -0.3126 0.3738
(0.9602) (0.9288) (0.6364) (0.8143) (0.8517) (0.8739)
Aisle neighbor -4.5725*** -5.3313*** -2.3274*** 0.6279 0.5586 1.2276
(0.9274) (0.9168) (0.6103) (0.8272) (0.8037) (0.8504)
Diagonal front -0.2283 -0.3700 -0.0932 0.2807 0.3458 0.5401
table neighbor (0.3426) (0.3651) (0.3252) (0.3952) (0.4183) (0.3873)
Diagonal back 0.3251 0.3817 0.6511* 0.9674** 1.1513*** 1.0637***
table neighbor (0.3530) (0.3380) (0.3572) (0.3875) (0.3721) (0.3751)
Diagonal front 0.5245 0.4701 0.7791** 1.0238*** 1.4032*** 1.7044***
aisle neighbor (0.3825) (0.3730) (0.3285) (0.3614) (0.3912) (0.3839)
Diagonal back 0.2061 0.4264 0.7362** 1.0453*** 1.1317*** 0.9278**
aisle neighbor (0.3807) (0.3392) (0.3183) (0.3686) (0.3920) (0.3641)
Front neighbor 0.0996 -0.1250 0.3042 0.4838 0.6712 0.8496*
(0.3729) (0.3963) (0.3552) (0.4625) (0.4578) (0.4481)
Back neighbor -0.7913* -0.7282* -0.6897* -1.2812*** -1.4769*** -0.4224
(0.4144) (0.4278) (0.3949) (0.4464) (0.4691) (0.4094)
Constant 90.4269*** 90.6118*** 84.8873*** 85.5201*** 88.2682*** 97.4141***
(0.3470) (0.6720) (1.3309) (1.1624) (1.1618) (0.7335)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Country pair- X X X X X X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,764,621 1,548,893 1,548,893 1,230,606 1,080,148 1,080,148
Adjusted R2 0.3865 0.3454 0.3578 0.3679 0.3775 0.3963
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.34: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: country pair-fixed effects
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -5.1441*** -4.2661*** -2.3961** -5.0723*** -5.4157*** -5.8565***
(1.2105) (1.0094) (1.0038) (1.1202) (1.2632) (1.1915)
Aisle neighbor -6.0942*** -4.5850*** -2.6369** -5.1672*** -6.0696*** -5.4350***
(1.2358) (1.0793) (1.0102) (1.1762) (1.5533) (1.4876)
Diagonal front -0.7429 1.1669 1.7337** 1.3804 1.1103 1.2738
table neighbor (0.7680) (0.8058) (0.8152) (0.9671) (0.9857) (0.9168)
Diagonal back -0.4689 1.0652 1.8404* 1.4906 2.0022** 2.1470**
table neighbor (0.8172) (0.9597) (1.0133) (0.9300) (0.9081) (0.8834)
Diagonal front -1.7820** 0.6155 1.1658 1.7159* 1.4966 0.8723
aisle neighbor (0.8519) (0.8326) (0.8245) (0.9624) (1.0232) (0.9215)
Diagonal back -0.6680 1.4684* 2.1942*** 1.8739*** 2.6012*** 2.5264***
aisle neighbor (0.8380) (0.8736) (0.8093) (0.6776) (0.7246) (0.6830)
Front neighbor -1.1044* 0.8470 1.2806** 0.6833 0.1699 0.9274
(0.6416) (0.6186) (0.6372) (0.7128) (0.7562) (0.6924)
Back neighbor -0.7611 1.1187 1.9921*** 2.6590*** 3.1783*** 2.7656***
(0.6671) (0.7389) (0.6740) (0.7137) (0.7548) (0.6537)
Constant 66.8837*** 50.4880*** 46.4313*** 54.4528*** 56.3395*** 70.0200**
(1.0948) (3.8925) (4.1396) (5.0292) (5.3223) (28.2687)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Country pair- X X X X X X
fixed effects?
Observations 678,266 616,201 616,201 545,879 500,936 500,936
Adjusted R2 0.1979 0.2565 0.2635 0.2717 0.2746 0.3076
Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.35: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness
test: standard errors clustered at the year-level
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.1930 -0.2662 -0.1146 -0.2027 -0.6589*** -0.2726**
(0.2190) (0.1988) (0.1612) (0.1563) (0.1612) (0.1253)
Aisle neighbor -0.1585 -0.0169 0.1747 0.0486 -0.3664** 0.0769
(0.2043) (0.1930) (0.1538) (0.1526) (0.1618) (0.1483)
Diagonal front -0.5530*** -0.8692*** -0.7176*** -0.4502*** -0.4386** -0.2881**
table neighbor (0.2009) (0.2178) (0.1779) (0.1533) (0.1849) (0.1327)
Diagonal back -0.4294** -0.7199*** -0.5610*** -0.3334** -0.3099* -0.1721
table neighbor (0.1877) (0.1946) (0.1601) (0.1337) (0.1548) (0.1312)
Diagonal front -0.3629* -0.7080*** -0.5244*** -0.3522* -0.4157** -0.2344*
aisle neighbor (0.2137) (0.2199) (0.1799) (0.1757) (0.1811) (0.1299)
Diagonal back -0.3599* -0.7696*** -0.5836*** -0.4751*** -0.5145*** -0.2603*
aisle neighbor (0.1985) (0.2008) (0.1609) (0.1620) (0.1644) (0.1337)
Front neighbor -0.6080*** -0.6900*** -0.5470*** -0.1911 -0.1766 -0.0134
(0.1847) (0.1989) (0.1623) (0.1638) (0.1986) (0.1403)
Back neighbor -0.6419*** -0.7224*** -0.5850*** -0.3507*** -0.2738 -0.0059
(0.1609) (0.1734) (0.1403) (0.1252) (0.1651) (0.1341)
Constant 82.5061*** 90.5030*** 88.2221*** 89.9111*** 88.5837*** 557.7885***
(0.4072) (0.9571) (1.3920) (1.2099) (1.3252) (116.8664)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 79,742,480 68,079,315 68,079,315 55,040,433 48,947,754 48,947,754
Adjusted R2 0.0000 0.0407 0.0429 0.0526 0.0534 0.1460
Standard errors clustered at the year-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.36: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA
resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: standard errors clustered at the year-level
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Arab League member states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor -0.5768 0.9110* 1.2710*** 1.6656*** 2.4834*** -0.1719
(0.5259) (0.4718) (0.4291) (0.3986) (0.3690) (0.2660)
Aisle neighbor 0.0755 1.2929*** 1.9041*** 2.7268*** 3.9967*** 0.7507***
(0.4405) (0.3839) (0.3574) (0.3734) (0.3370) (0.2148)
Diagonal front 1.0377* 0.8872* 0.8984* 1.0764** 1.3258** 0.0762
table neighbor (0.5840) (0.4941) (0.4729) (0.4904) (0.5500) (0.3794)
Diagonal back 0.7930 -0.4725 -0.2644 -0.3885 0.1193 0.8689**
table neighbor (0.6673) (0.6638) (0.6399) (0.7415) (0.7914) (0.3264)
Diagonal front 0.1006 0.7287 0.9082* 1.1936** 1.5723*** 1.2440***
aisle neighbor (0.7557) (0.5377) (0.4798) (0.4895) (0.5298) (0.3249)
Diagonal back 0.7624 -0.2113 0.1147 0.1952 0.3403 0.7209**
aisle neighbor (0.5700) (0.4631) (0.4358) (0.5261) (0.6000) (0.2796)
Front neighbor 1.3110** 1.3656** 1.5912*** 1.8383*** 1.9764*** 0.5360
(0.4904) (0.5171) (0.5220) (0.6266) (0.6278) (0.3586)
Back neighbor -1.6981** -3.3359*** -3.0860*** -3.4869*** -4.2761*** -1.3254
(0.7215) (0.7108) (0.6993) (0.9915) (1.0992) (1.0406)
Constant 90.3622*** 98.3148*** 91.0362*** 90.5369*** 90.1272*** 360.7761***
(0.3741) (0.5040) (1.1749) (1.0930) (1.1234) (78.6743)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 1,764,621 1,548,893 1,548,893 1,230,606 1,080,148 1,080,148
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0627 0.0844 0.0877 0.0903 0.3956
Standard errors clustered at the year-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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Table A.37: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA
resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: standard errors clustered at the year-level
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table neighbor 0.6309 0.0795 0.7904 0.8859 -2.1760*** -2.9247***
(0.8014) (0.7292) (0.7213) (0.5908) (0.6610) (0.6044)
Aisle neighbor -1.1768 -1.1785* -0.3039 -0.0453 -3.9753*** -3.2671***
(0.7741) (0.6052) (0.6139) (0.5858) (0.9093) (0.7780)
Diagonal front -0.8313 0.8326 1.0404 0.1211 0.2536 0.4440
table neighbor (0.7164) (0.7883) (0.7369) (0.8266) (0.9435) (0.8421)
Diagonal back -0.7038 -0.9220 -0.1902 0.0634 0.7678 1.0145
table neighbor (0.9056) (0.9889) (1.0736) (0.9987) (0.9970) (0.7334)
Diagonal front -2.5088*** -0.1509 0.3907 0.7717 1.0335 0.1356
aisle neighbor (0.7843) (0.8838) (0.8292) (0.8671) (0.9496) (0.8124)
Diagonal back -1.1191 -0.4886 0.3491 1.4540** 2.2364*** 1.7562***
aisle neighbor (0.9293) (0.7832) (0.7898) (0.7036) (0.7155) (0.5995)
Front neighbor -2.3284*** -0.0569 0.5716 0.4572 0.6016 0.3718
(0.6691) (0.6577) (0.6170) (0.6221) (0.7522) (0.5730)
Back neighbor -2.9018*** -1.1009 -0.5260 0.9661 1.6592** 2.3620***
(0.6319) (0.7912) (0.7656) (0.7297) (0.7733) (0.4824)
Constant 66.8453*** 60.9893*** 56.0594*** 67.1480*** 66.6721*** 1,076.388
(1.3123) (4.9718) (5.1946) (5.8945) (5.8539) (820.7188)
Political variables?a. 7 X X X X X
Resolution variables?b. 7 X X X X X
Delegation variables?c. 7 7 X X X X
Macro variables?d. 7 7 7 X X X
Linguistic variables?e. 7 7 7 7 X X
Spatial variables?f. 7 7 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 7 7 X
Seating arrangement- 7 7 7 7 7 X
fixed effects?
Observations 678,266 616,201 616,201 545,879 500,936 500,936
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0714 0.1063 0.2081 0.2125 0.3067
Standard errors clustered at the year–level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the
differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East,
nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country’s number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-
permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,
and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.
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B.1 Tables
Table B.1: Summary statistics, resolutions between 1950-2018 without Israel
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
UNGA vote agreement rate with Israel, 8,405 0.13 0.18 0 1
Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions
UNGA vote agreement rate with Israel, 8,049 0.11 0.18 0 1
only State of Israel-related resolutions
Continuous autocracy index, mirrored 8,405 0.47 0.41 0 1
democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 7,472 8.68 1.18 5.37 12.44
Growth of real GDP 7,421 4.35 9.43 -71.10 116.16
Logarithm of population 7,472 1.86 1.84 -3.20 7.20
Share of Jewish population 6,951 0 0 0 0.04
relative to total population
Member of Arab League 8,405 0.12 0.32 0 1
US and Pacific islands delegation 8,405 0.01 0.08 0 1
Share of Middle Eastern topic resolutions 8,405 0.21 0.08 0.02 0.38
Share of economic development topic resolutions 8,405 0.12 0.06 0 0.40
Share of disarmament topic resolutions 8,405 0.21 0.07 0 0.35
Share of nuclear proliferation topic resolutions 8,405 0.15 0.05 0 0.24
Share of colonialism topic resolutions 8,405 0.17 0.06 0 0.37
Share of human rights topic resolutions 8,405 0.22 0.09 0 0.37
Dichotomous autocracy variable, mirrored 8,405 0.47 0.50 0 1
democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)
Mirrored democracy index 8,631 0.52 0.50 0 1
by Gründler and Krieger (2019)
Autocracy index by Marshall et al. (2019) 7,459 3.17 3.52 0 10
Mirrored Revised Combined Polity score 7,675 -1.24 7.37 -10 10
by Marshall et al. (2019)
Left-wing government 4,014 0.54 0.50 0 1
Right-wing government 4,014 0.34 0.47 0 1
Absolute difference of ideal points with Israel 9,552 2.15 1.04 0 4.94
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Table B.2: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and
Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: government ideology
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index -0.0925*** -0.0675*** -0.0732*** -0.1044***
(0.0098) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0156)
Left-wing government -0.0143 -0.0125 -0.0128 -0.0056
(0.0106) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0094)
Right-wing government 0.0329*** 0.0127 0.0109 0.0282***
(0.0114) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0097)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0363*** 0.0375*** 0.0036
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0138)
Growth of real GDP -0.0009*** -0.0005** -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population 0.0013 0.0017 0.1649***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0282)
Share of Jewish population 4.7358*** 4.2397*** -6.9500***
(1.3005) (1.3171) (2.1081)
Member of Arab League -0.0678*** -0.0654*** -0.0423
(0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0808)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.5425*** 0.5496*** -0.1672**
(0.0466) (0.0476) (0.0745)
Constant 0.1564*** 0.2696*** -5.0608*** -3.1804
(0.0088) (0.0414) (1.7041) (2.0187)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 4,014 2,996 2,996 2,996
Countries 138 125 125 125
Adjusted R2 0.1150 0.4737 0.5060 0.6716
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.3: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State
of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: government
ideology
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index -0.1177*** -0.0756*** -0.0767*** -0.1005***
(0.0101) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0182)
Left-wing government -0.0141 -0.0138 -0.0149 -0.0013
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0113)
Right-wing government 0.0382*** 0.0187* 0.0162 0.0370***
(0.0113) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0116)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0353*** 0.0369*** 0.0039
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0149)
Growth of real GDP -0.0006** -0.0005 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Logarithm of population -0.0005 -0.0003 0.2065***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0317)
Share of Jewish population 4.9243*** 4.4398*** -6.4740**
(1.2702) (1.2983) (2.5315)
Member of Arab League -0.0828*** -0.0816*** -0.0634
(0.0112) (0.0120) (0.1369)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.5186*** 0.5264*** -0.4879**
(0.0501) (0.0507) (0.2215)
Constant 0.1506*** 0.1045** -3.6988* 1.9677
(0.0085) (0.0501) (2.0912) (14.1556)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 3,974 2,966 2,966 2,966
Countries 137 124 124 124
Adjusted R2 0.1150 0.4737 0.5060 0.6716
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.4: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and
Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: mirrored dichotomous democracy variable by Gründler and
Krieger (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mirrored dichotomous democracy variable -0.0448*** -0.0379*** -0.0427*** -0.0123
(0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0077)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0239*** 0.0249*** 0.0074
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0080)
Growth of real GDP -0.0003* -0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Logarithm of population -0.0023* -0.0015 0.0618***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0162)
Share of Jewish population 6.4546*** 6.1900*** -3.9062
(1.3900) (1.3181) (2.6640)
Member of Arab League -0.0910*** -0.0886*** 0.0683
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0420)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4286*** 0.4295*** 0.1212
(0.0685) (0.0659) (0.1732)
Constant 0.1525*** 0.1632*** 0.1379 0.6871
(0.0044) (0.0313) (0.7057) (0.7990)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,405 6,261 6,261 6,261
Countries 185 167 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0150 0.3754 0.4811 0.6081
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.5: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State
of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: mirrored
dichotomous democracy variable by Gründler and Krieger (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mirrored dichotomous democracy variable -0.0646*** -0.0472*** -0.0482*** -0.0144
(0.0060) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0089)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0224*** 0.0238*** 0.0117
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0093)
Growth of real GDP -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0038** -0.0035** 0.0992***
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0185)
Share of Jewish population 7.1915*** 6.9926*** -2.8450
(1.5227) (1.4922) (3.0108)
Member of Arab League -0.1057*** -0.1062*** 0.0587
(0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0437)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4250*** 0.4281*** -0.2989
(0.0669) (0.0652) (.)
Constant 0.1443*** 0.1163*** 0.4096 0.7367
(0.0044) (0.0336) (0.3214) (0.6965)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,049 6,039 6,039 6,039
Countries 185 167 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0313 0.3388 0.3858 0.5513
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.6: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and
Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: mirrored democracy variable by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mirrored democracy variable -0.0809*** -0.0474*** -0.0518*** -0.0180**
(0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0087)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0215*** 0.0224*** 0.0070
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0080)
Growth of real GDP -0.0003* -0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Logarithm of population -0.0024* -0.0016 0.0640***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0160)
Share of Jewish population 6.4172*** 6.1775*** -3.9216
(1.3956) (1.3246) (2.6580)
Member of Arab League -0.0844*** -0.0820*** 0.0693*
(0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0418)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4287*** 0.4291*** 0.9426***
(0.0684) (0.0658) (0.1724)
Constant 0.1803*** 0.1863*** 1.0344* 0.0339
(0.0053) (0.0320) (0.5884) (0.7371)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,633 6,284 6,284 6,284
Countries 193 168 168 168
Adjusted R2 0.0431 0.3795 0.4855 0.6084
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.7: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State
of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: mirrored
democracy variable by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mirrored democracy variable -0.0990*** -0.0592*** -0.0607*** -0.0201**
(0.0065) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0098)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0193*** 0.0206*** 0.0112
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0093)
Growth of real GDP -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0039** -0.0035** 0.1020***
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0183)
Share of Jewish population 7.1430*** 6.9468*** -2.8564
(1.5273) (1.4964) (3.0023)
Member of Arab League -0.0974*** -0.0975*** 0.0599
(0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0435)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4252*** 0.4284*** -0.3229
(0.0668) (0.0650) (.)
Constant 0.1730*** 0.1469*** 0.4406 1.1646
(0.0055) (0.0345) (0.6530) (.)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,269 6,062 6,062 6,062
Countries 193 168 168 168
Adjusted R2 0.0630 0.3446 0.3923 0.5517
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.8: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and
Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: mirrored Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al.
(2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mirrored Revised Combined Polity score -0.0043*** -0.0029*** -0.0033*** -0.0011
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0221*** 0.0225*** 0.0032
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0084)
Growth of real GDP -0.0004** -0.0003 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0054*** -0.0048*** 0.0448***
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0163)
Share of Jewish population 6.5086*** 6.2695*** -3.8304
(1.4040) (1.3298) (2.8031)
Member of Arab League -0.0873*** -0.0835*** 0.0674
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0421)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4349*** 0.4358*** 0.6209***
(0.0682) (0.0655) (0.1369)
Constant 0.1257*** 0.1576*** -0.0090 -0.3008
(0.0030) (0.0320) (0.4288) (0.4150)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 7,675 5,676 5,676 5,676
Countries 169 151 151 151
Adjusted R2 0.0296 0.3855 0.4906 0.6131
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.9: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of
Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: mirrored Revised
Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mirrored Revised Combined Polity score -0.0053*** -0.0033*** -0.0034*** -0.0011
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0208*** 0.0219*** 0.0041
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0097)
Growth of real GDP -0.0003* -0.0003 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0060*** -0.0057*** 0.0755***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0184)
Share of Jewish population 7.2110*** 7.0252*** -2.7480
(1.5435) (1.5059) (3.1661)
Member of Arab League -0.1024*** -0.1012*** 0.0556
(0.0079) (0.0082) (0.0440)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4300*** 0.4333*** 0.2126
(0.0664) (0.0646) (0.1514)
Constant 0.1056*** 0.1020*** 1.1347*** 1.3089
(0.0031) (0.0346) (0.2946) (.)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 7,356 5,482 5,482 5,482
Countries 169 151 151 151
Adjusted R2 0.0470 0.3475 0.3936 0.5587
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.10: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and
Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutionalized Autocracy score -0.0067*** -0.0050*** -0.0059*** -0.0023*
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0266*** 0.0277*** 0.0045
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0086)
Growth of real GDP -0.0005** -0.0003 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0051*** -0.0045*** 0.0441***
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0165)
Share of Jewish population 6.2375*** 5.9486*** -4.9087*
(1.3584) (1.2770) (2.6849)
Member of Arab League -0.0928*** -0.0882*** 0.0684
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0423)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4395*** 0.4410*** 0.6183***
(0.0677) (0.0650) (0.1340)
Constant 0.1524*** 0.1411*** 0.0893 -0.2379
(0.0046) (0.0328) (0.4179) (0.5409)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 7,459 5,523 5,523 5,523
Countries 168 150 150 150
Adjusted R2 0.0165 0.3907 0.4978 0.6234
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.11: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of
Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: Institutionalized
Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutionalized Autocracy score -0.0092*** -0.0058*** -0.0063*** -0.0024
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0257*** 0.0269*** 0.0051
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0099)
Growth of real GDP -0.0004* -0.0004* 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0055*** -0.0052*** 0.0742***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0187)
Share of Jewish population 6.6637*** 6.4841*** -4.4309
(1.4010) (1.3798) (2.9244)
Member of Arab League -0.1069*** -0.1054*** 0.0568
(0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0441)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4409*** 0.4436*** 0.6104***
(0.0645) (0.0631) (0.0873)
Constant 0.1418*** 0.0854** -0.3138 -0.6173
(0.0046) (0.0353) (0.2879) (0.8548)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 7,163 5,345 5,345 5,345
Countries 167 150 150 150
Adjusted R2 0.0317 0.3517 0.3972 0.5655
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.12: Robustness test: absolute difference of ideal points between Israel and UNGA member countries for votes
on all contested UNGA resolutions
Dependent variable:
absolute difference of ideal points with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index 0.6466*** 0.5238*** 0.5480*** 0.3383***
(0.0406) (0.0415) (0.0399) (0.0478)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita -0.2384*** -0.2440*** -0.0601**
(0.0130) (0.0123) (0.0279)
Growth of real GDP 0.0048*** 0.0038*** 0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Logarithm of population -0.0285*** -0.0290*** 1.2509***
(0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0898)
Share of Jewish population -10.9983* -9.2906 38.4174***
(5.9508) (5.7017) (8.7494)
Member of Arab League 0.6246*** 0.6139*** -0.2325
(0.0379) (0.0363) (0.1514)
US and Pacific islands delegation -0.0399 -0.0660 0.7795**
(0.2603) (0.2664) (0.3041)
Constant 1.8312*** 2.2893*** 1.5267*** -8.6217***
(0.0245) (0.1360) (0.2828) (0.7330)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 9,552 7,126 7,126 7,126
Countries 185 168 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0654 0.5873 0.6468 0.8045
Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.13: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel-
and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: standard errors clustered at country-level
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index -0.0670*** -0.0666*** -0.0744*** -0.0317
(0.0199) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0217)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0196*** 0.0203*** 0.0075
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0130)
Growth of real GDP -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0026 -0.0018 0.0614**
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0286)
Share of Jewish population 6.1406* 5.8238* -3.9192
(3.1850) (3.2393) (7.4050)
Member of Arab League -0.0792*** -0.0757*** 0.0665
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0493)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4358*** 0.4376*** 0.1247
(0.0759) (0.0768) (0.3483)
Constant 0.1632*** 0.2129*** 0.1028 0.6669
(0.0149) (0.0472) (0.7618) (0.6860)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,405 6,261 6,261 6,261
Countries 185 167 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0227 0.3810 0.4878 0.6089
Standard errors clustered at country-level in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.14: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of
Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: standard errors
clustered at country-level
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index -0.0925*** -0.0827*** -0.0846*** -0.0359
(0.0193) (0.0186) (0.0194) (0.0246)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0172*** 0.0186*** 0.0119
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0147)
Growth of real GDP -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0042 -0.0038 0.0991***
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0318)
Share of Jewish population 6.8080* 6.5724* -2.8709
(3.6004) (3.6531) (7.7717)
Member of Arab League -0.0911*** -0.0913*** 0.0567
(0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0585)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4336*** 0.4372*** -0.2978**
(0.0839) (0.0849) (0.3640)
Constant 0.1576*** 0.1785*** 0.4138 0.7242**
(0.0141) (0.0520) (0.2824) (0.3110)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,049 6,039 6,039 6,039
Countries 185 167 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0436 0.3469 0.3942 0.5523
Standard errors clustered at country-level in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.15: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel-
and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: Jackknife standard errors
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index -0.0670*** -0.0666*** -0.0744*** -0.0317***
(0.0048) (0.0060) (0.0056) (0.0081)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0196*** 0.0203*** 0.0075
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0062)
Growth of real GDP -0.0003* -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Logarithm of population -0.0026*** -0.0018* 0.0614***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0125)
Share of Jewish population 6.1406*** 5.8238*** -3.9192**
(0.9731) (0.8664) (1.9329)
Member of Arab League -0.0792*** -0.0757*** 0.0665*
(0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0384)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4358*** 0.4376*** 0.2832***
(0.0483) (0.0446) (0.0945)
Constant 0.1632*** 0.2129*** 0.5815 0.4241
(0.0032) (0.0276) (2.3147) (2.0104)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,405 6,261 6,261 6,261
Countries 185 167 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0227 0.3810 0.4878 0.6089
Jackknife standard errors in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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Table B.16: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State
of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: Jackknife
standard errors
Dependent variable:
vote agreement rate with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous autocracy index -0.0925*** -0.0827*** -0.0846*** -0.0359***
(0.0048) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0092)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita 0.0172*** 0.0186*** 0.0119
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0071)
Growth of real GDP -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Logarithm of population -0.0042*** -0.0038*** 0.0991***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0138)
Share of Jewish population 6.8080*** 6.5724*** -2.8709
(1.0073) (0.9622) (2.1435)
Member of Arab League -0.0911*** -0.0913*** 0.0567
(0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0409)
US and Pacific islands delegation 0.4336*** 0.4372*** 0.0083
(0.0455) (0.0438) (0.1043)
Constant 0.1576*** 0.1785*** -0.1621 -0.1536
(0.0031) (0.0280) (2.5021) (2.4676)
Topic-share variables?a. 7 X X X
Year-fixed effects? 7 7 X X
Country-fixed effects? 7 7 7 X
Observations 8,049 6,039 6,039 6,039
Countries 185 167 167 167
Adjusted R2 0.0436 0.3469 0.3942 0.5523
Jackknife standard errors in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
7 indicates that the respective variables are not included, X indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament,
nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.
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C.1 Tables
Table C.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Yearly average agreement rate 1,336 0.54 0.103 0.2 0.95
Yearly absolute difference of ideal points 1,291 1.67 0.446 0.11 3.6
US president Donald Trump 1,340 0.1 0.3 0 1
Ideological distance 1,059 0.99 0.924 0 2
Log of real GDP per capita 1,230 10.31 0.407 8.99 11.5
Growth of real GDP 1,239 2.6 2.983 -14.81 25.01
Log of population 1,230 2.26 1.669 -3.51 4.85
Allied with US in conflict 1,295 0.36 0.479 0 1
Share of Middle Eastern resolutions 1,340 0.23 0.069 0 0.38
Share of economic development resolutions 1,340 0.11 0.042 0 0.33
Share of disarmament resolutions 1,340 0.23 0.059 0 0.35
Share of nuclear proliferation resolutions 1,340 0.16 0.044 0 0.24
Share of colonialism resolutions 1,340 0.15 0.049 0 0.22
Share of human rights resolutions 1,340 0.24 0.081 0 0.67
Only countries that have been either G7, NATO, OECD and/or UN WEOG members since 1980
are included (excluding the United States)
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